26 May, 2016
1 commit
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Commit 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") causes lockups
when someone hits a Yama denial. Call chain:process_vm_readv -> process_vm_rw -> process_vm_rw_core -> mm_access
-> ptrace_may_access
task_lock(...) is taken
__ptrace_may_access -> security_ptrace_access_check
-> yama_ptrace_access_check -> report_access -> kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
-> get_cmdline -> access_process_vm -> get_task_mm
task_lock(...) is taken againtask_lock(p) just calls spin_lock(&p->alloc_lock), so at this point,
spin_lock() is called on a lock that is already held by the current
process.Also: Since the alloc_lock is a spinlock, sleeping inside
security_ptrace_access_check hooks is probably not allowed at all? So it's
not even possible to print the cmdline from in there because that might
involve paging in userspace memory.It would be tempting to rewrite ptrace_may_access() to drop the alloc_lock
before calling the LSM, but even then, ptrace_may_access() itself might be
called from various contexts in which you're not allowed to sleep; for
example, as far as I understand, to be able to hold a reference to another
task, usually an RCU read lock will be taken (see e.g. kcmp() and
get_robust_list()), so that also prohibits sleeping. (And using e.g. FUSE,
a user can cause pagefault handling to take arbitrary amounts of time -
see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808.)Therefore, AFAIK, in order to print the name of a process below
security_ptrace_access_check(), you'd have to either grab a reference to
the mm_struct and defer the access violation reporting or just use the
"comm" value that's stored in kernelspace and accessible without big
complications. (Or you could try to use some kind of atomic remote VM
access that fails if the memory isn't paged in, similar to
copy_from_user_inatomic(), and if necessary fall back to comm, but
that'd be kind of ugly because the comm/cmdline choice would look
pretty random to the user.)Fix it by deferring reporting of the access violation until current
exits kernelspace the next time.v2: Don't oops on PTRACE_TRACEME, call report_access under
task_lock(current). Also fix nonsensical comment. And don't use
GPF_ATOMIC for memory allocation with no locks held.
This patch is tested both for ptrace attach and ptrace traceme.Fixes: 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
05 May, 2016
1 commit
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Access reporting often happens from atomic contexes. Avoid
lockups when allocating memory for command lines.Fixes: 8a56038c2ae ("Yama: consolidate error reporting")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin
21 Apr, 2016
1 commit
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Use a common error reporting function for Yama violation reports, and give
more detail into the process command lines.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
21 Jan, 2016
1 commit
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It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.Signed-off-by: Jann Horn
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Cc: James Morris
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Cc: Andy Shevchenko
Cc: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Willy Tarreau
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
28 Jul, 2015
1 commit
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Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
12 May, 2015
3 commits
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Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Add a list header for each security hook. They aren't used until
later in the patch series. They are grouped together in a structure
so that there doesn't need to be an external address for each.Macro-ize the initialization of the security_operations
for each security module in anticipation of changing out
the security_operations structure.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The security.h header file serves two purposes,
interfaces for users of the security modules and
interfaces for security modules. Users of the
security modules don't need to know about what's
in the security_operations structure, so pull it
out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.hSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
28 Feb, 2015
2 commits
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Yama selects SECURITYFS and SECURITY_PATH, but requires neither.
Remove them.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook -
When the sysctl table is constified, we won't be able to directly modify
it. Instead, use a table copy that carries any needed changes.Suggested-by: PaX Team
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
27 Mar, 2013
1 commit
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Change the permission check for yama_ptrace_ptracee to the standard
ptrace permission check, testing if the traceer has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
in the tracees user namespace.Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
18 Dec, 2012
1 commit
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Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"While small this set of changes is very significant with respect to
containers in general and user namespaces in particular. The user
space interface is now complete.This set of changes adds support for unprivileged users to create user
namespaces and as a user namespace root to create other namespaces.
The tyranny of supporting suid root preventing unprivileged users from
using cool new kernel features is broken.This set of changes completes the work on setns, adding support for
the pid, user, mount namespaces.This set of changes includes a bunch of basic pid namespace
cleanups/simplifications. Of particular significance is the rework of
the pid namespace cleanup so it no longer requires sending out
tendrils into all kinds of unexpected cleanup paths for operation. At
least one case of broken error handling is fixed by this cleanup.The files under /proc//ns/ have been converted from regular files
to magic symlinks which prevents incorrect caching by the VFS,
ensuring the files always refer to the namespace the process is
currently using and ensuring that the ptrace_mayaccess permission
checks are always applied.The files under /proc//ns/ have been given stable inode numbers
so it is now possible to see if different processes share the same
namespaces.Through the David Miller's net tree are changes to relax many of the
permission checks in the networking stack to allowing the user
namespace root to usefully use the networking stack. Similar changes
for the mount namespace and the pid namespace are coming through my
tree.Two small changes to add user namespace support were commited here adn
in David Miller's -net tree so that I could complete the work on the
/proc//ns/ files in this tree.Work remains to make it safe to build user namespaces and 9p, afs,
ceph, cifs, coda, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, ocfs2, and xfs so the
Kconfig guard remains in place preventing that user namespaces from
being built when any of those filesystems are enabled.Future design work remains to allow root users outside of the initial
user namespace to mount more than just /proc and /sys."* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (38 commits)
proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.
proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks.
proc: Generalize proc inode allocation
userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs
userns: For /proc/self/{uid,gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file
procfs: Print task uids and gids in the userns that opened the proc file
userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
userns: Implent proc namespace operations
userns: Kill task_user_ns
userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter
userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns.
userns: Allow unprivileged users to create new namespaces
userns: Allow setting a userns mapping to your current uid.
userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation
userns: Allow unprivileged users to create user namespaces.
userns: Ignore suid and sgid on binaries if the uid or gid can not be mapped
userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure
vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace.
vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces
vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace
...
21 Nov, 2012
2 commits
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Instead of locking the list during a delete, mark entries as invalid
and trigger a workqueue to clean them up. This lets us easily handle
task_free from interrupt context.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
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Stop using spinlocks in the read path. Add RCU list to handle the readers.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Reviewed-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: John Johansen
20 Nov, 2012
1 commit
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The task_user_ns function hides the fact that it is getting the user
namespace from struct cred on the task. struct cred may go away as
soon as the rcu lock is released. This leads to a race where we
can dereference a stale user namespace pointer.To make it obvious a struct cred is involved kill task_user_ns.
To kill the race modify the users of task_user_ns to only
reference the user namespace while the rcu lock is held.Cc: Kees Cook
Cc: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
28 Sep, 2012
1 commit
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Linux 3.6-rc7
Requested by David Howells so he can merge his key susbsystem work into
my tree with requisite -linus changesets.
07 Sep, 2012
1 commit
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When running a 64-bit kernel and receiving prctls from a 32-bit
userspace, the "-1" used as an unsigned long will end up being
misdetected. The kernel is looking for 0xffffffffffffffff instead of
0xffffffff. Since prctl lacks a distinct compat interface, Yama needs
to handle this translation itself. As such, support either value as
meaning PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY, to avoid breaking the ABI for 64-bit.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: John Johansen
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris
06 Sep, 2012
1 commit
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Unconditionally call Yama when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED is selected,
no matter what LSM module is primary.Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora
has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having multiple
distributions (or LSM authors) carrying these patches, just allow Yama
to be called unconditionally when selected by the new CONFIG.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: John Johansen
Signed-off-by: James Morris
17 Aug, 2012
1 commit
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The core ptrace access checking routine holds a task lock, and when
reporting a failure, Yama takes a separate task lock. To avoid a
potential deadlock with two ptracers taking the opposite locks, do not
use get_task_comm() and just use ->comm directly since accuracy is not
important for the report.Reported-by: Fengguang Wu
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: John Johansen
Signed-off-by: James Morris
10 Aug, 2012
1 commit
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The higher ptrace restriction levels should be blocking even
PTRACE_TRACEME requests. The comments in the LSM documentation are
misleading about when the checks happen (the parent does not go through
security_ptrace_access_check() on a PTRACE_TRACEME call).Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5.x and later
Signed-off-by: James Morris
15 May, 2012
1 commit
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When checking capabilities, the question we want to be asking is "does
current() have the capability in the child's namespace?"Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
23 Apr, 2012
1 commit
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GCC complains that we don't use "one" any more after 389da25f93 "Yama:
add additional ptrace scopes".security/yama/yama_lsm.c:322:12: warning: ?one? defined but not used
[-Wunused-variable]Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
19 Apr, 2012
1 commit
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This expands the available Yama ptrace restrictions to include two more
modes. Mode 2 requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE for PTRACE_ATTACH, and mode 3
completely disables PTRACE_ATTACH (and locks the sysctl).Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
16 Feb, 2012
1 commit
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For a process to entirely disable Yama ptrace restrictions, it can use
the special PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY pid to indicate that any otherwise allowed
process may ptrace it. This is stronger than calling PR_SET_PTRACER with
pid "1" because it includes processes in external pid namespaces. This is
currently needed by the Chrome renderer, since its crash handler (Breakpad)
runs external to the renderer's pid namespace.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
10 Feb, 2012
1 commit
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This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: John Johansen
Signed-off-by: James Morris