22 Jul, 2018

1 commit

  • commit c604cb767049b78b3075497b80ebb8fd530ea2cc upstream.

    My recent fix for dns_resolver_preparse() printing very long strings was
    incomplete, as shown by syzbot which still managed to hit the
    WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() by adding a crafted "dns_resolver" key:

    precision 50001 too large
    WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 864 at lib/vsprintf.c:2164 vsnprintf+0x48a/0x5a0

    The bug this time isn't just a printing bug, but also a logical error
    when multiple options ("#"-separated strings) are given in the key
    payload. Specifically, when separating an option string into name and
    value, if there is no value then the name is incorrectly considered to
    end at the end of the key payload, rather than the end of the current
    option. This bypasses validation of the option length, and also means
    that specifying multiple options is broken -- which presumably has gone
    unnoticed as there is currently only one valid option anyway.

    A similar problem also applied to option values, as the kstrtoul() when
    parsing the "dnserror" option will read past the end of the current
    option and into the next option.

    Fix these bugs by correctly computing the length of the option name and
    by copying the option value, null-terminated, into a temporary buffer.

    Reproducer for the WARN_ONCE() that syzbot hit:

    perl -e 'print "#A#", "\0" x 50000' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s

    Reproducer for "dnserror" option being parsed incorrectly (expected
    behavior is to fail when seeing the unknown option "foo", actual
    behavior was to read the dnserror value as "1#foo" and fail there):

    perl -e 'print "#dnserror=1#foo\0"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s

    Reported-by: syzbot
    Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]")
    Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

    Eric Biggers
     

29 Apr, 2018

1 commit

  • [ Upstream commit 9c438d7a3a52dcc2b9ed095cb87d3a5e83cf7e60 ]

    Adding a dns_resolver key whose payload contains a very long option name
    resulted in that string being printed in full. This hit the WARN_ONCE()
    in set_precision() during the printk(), because printk() only supports a
    precision of up to 32767 bytes:

    precision 1000000 too large
    WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 752 at lib/vsprintf.c:2189 vsnprintf+0x4bc/0x5b0

    Fix it by limiting option strings (combined name + value) to a much more
    reasonable 128 bytes. The exact limit is arbitrary, but currently the
    only recognized option is formatted as "dnserror=%lu" which fits well
    within this limit.

    Also ratelimit the printks.

    Reproducer:

    perl -e 'print "#", "A" x 1000000, "\x00"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s

    This bug was found using syzkaller.

    Reported-by: Mark Rutland
    Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]")
    Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

    Eric Biggers
     

18 Oct, 2017

1 commit

  • Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
    error into one field such that:

    (1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.

    (2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.

    (3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.

    This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
    objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
    atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
    change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
    into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
    any locking.

    The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
    may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
    key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
    the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
    between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
    actually an error code.

    The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
    code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
    function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
    keys are also 'instantiated'.

    Additionally, barriering is included:

    (1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.

    (2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.

    Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
    payload content after reading the payload pointers.

    Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
    Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
    Reported-by: Eric Biggers
    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers

    David Howells
     

04 Mar, 2017

1 commit

  • Pull sched.h split-up from Ingo Molnar:
    "The point of these changes is to significantly reduce the
    header footprint, to speed up the kernel build and to
    have a cleaner header structure.

    After these changes the new 's typical preprocessed
    size goes down from a previous ~0.68 MB (~22K lines) to ~0.45 MB (~15K
    lines), which is around 40% faster to build on typical configs.

    Not much changed from the last version (-v2) posted three weeks ago: I
    eliminated quirks, backmerged fixes plus I rebased it to an upstream
    SHA1 from yesterday that includes most changes queued up in -next plus
    all sched.h changes that were pending from Andrew.

    I've re-tested the series both on x86 and on cross-arch defconfigs,
    and did a bisectability test at a number of random points.

    I tried to test as many build configurations as possible, but some
    build breakage is probably still left - but it should be mostly
    limited to architectures that have no cross-compiler binaries
    available on kernel.org, and non-default configurations"

    * 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (146 commits)
    sched/headers: Clean up
    sched/headers: Remove #ifdefs from
    sched/headers: Remove the include from
    sched/headers, hrtimer: Remove the include from
    sched/headers, x86/apic: Remove the header inclusion from
    sched/headers, timers: Remove the include from
    sched/headers: Remove from
    sched/headers: Remove from
    sched/core: Remove unused prefetch_stack()
    sched/headers: Remove from
    sched/headers: Remove the 'init_pid_ns' prototype from
    sched/headers: Remove from
    sched/headers: Remove from
    sched/headers: Remove the runqueue_is_locked() prototype
    sched/headers: Remove from
    sched/headers: Remove from
    sched/headers: Remove from
    sched/headers: Remove from
    sched/headers: Remove the include from
    sched/headers: Remove from
    ...

    Linus Torvalds
     

02 Mar, 2017

2 commits

  • Add #include dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
    doing that for them.

    Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
    it's still a net win, because is included in over
    2,200 files ...

    Acked-by: Linus Torvalds
    Cc: Mike Galbraith
    Cc: Peter Zijlstra
    Cc: Thomas Gleixner
    Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    Ingo Molnar
     
  • rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
    two different, incompatible ways:

    (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
    to protect the key.

    (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
    used to protect the key and the may be being modified.

    Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:

    (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:

    dereference_key_locked()
    user_key_payload_locked()

    (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:

    dereference_key_rcu()
    user_key_payload_rcu()

    This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper

    ===============================
    [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
    4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
    -------------------------------
    ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
    other info that might help us debug this:
    rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
    1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
    #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
    Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
    lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
    nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
    nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
    call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
    __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
    rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
    nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    do_mount+0x254/0xf70
    SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
    system_call+0x38/0xe0

    Reported-by: Jan Stancek
    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Tested-by: Jan Stancek
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     

12 Apr, 2016

1 commit

  • Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
    vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
    block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
    the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
    blacklisting.

    This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.

    To this end:

    (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
    the vetting function. This is called as:

    int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
    const struct key_type *key_type,
    unsigned long key_flags,
    const union key_payload *key_payload),

    where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
    key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
    AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.

    [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
    KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.

    The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
    error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
    link.

    The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
    through keyring_alloc().

    Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
    method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
    is called.

    (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
    key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
    restriction check.

    (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
    with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
    virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.

    (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
    used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
    pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
    of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.

    (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
    should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
    setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
    a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
    authoritative keys.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar

    David Howells
     

19 Nov, 2015

1 commit

  • Changes the definition of the pointer _expiry from time_t to
    time64_t. This is to handle the Y2038 problem where time_t
    will overflow in the year 2038. The change is safe because
    the kernel subsystems that call dns_query pass NULL.

    Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann
    Signed-off-by: Aya Mahfouz
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

    Aya Mahfouz
     

21 Oct, 2015

1 commit

  • Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
    as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

    Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
    user-defined keys.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
    cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
    cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
    cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
    cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
    cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
    cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net

    David Howells
     

30 Sep, 2014

1 commit


17 Sep, 2014

3 commits

  • Make the key matching functions pointed to by key_match_data::cmp return bool
    rather than int.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: Vivek Goyal

    David Howells
     
  • A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
    allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
    Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
    the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
    to override it as needed.

    The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
    user_match() function.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: Vivek Goyal

    David Howells
     
  • Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages:

    (1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.

    (2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the
    asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).

    (3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means
    that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.

    (4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: Vivek Goyal

    David Howells
     

23 Jul, 2014

2 commits


21 Jul, 2014

1 commit


18 Jul, 2014

1 commit

  • Special kernel keys, such as those used to hold DNS results for AFS, CIFS and
    NFS and those used to hold idmapper results for NFS, used to be
    'invalidateable' with key_revoke(). However, since the default permissions for
    keys were reduced:

    Commit: 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1
    KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys

    it has become impossible to do this.

    Add a key flag (KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL) that will permit a key to be
    invalidated by root. This should not be used for system keyrings as the
    garbage collector will try and remove any invalidate key. For system keyrings,
    KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR can be used instead.

    After this, from userspace, keyctl_invalidate() and "keyctl invalidate" can be
    used by any possessor of CAP_SYS_ADMIN (typically root) to invalidate DNS and
    idmapper keys. Invalidated keys are immediately garbage collected and will be
    immediately rerequested if needed again.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Tested-by: Steve Dickson

    David Howells
     

12 Jun, 2014

1 commit


11 Jun, 2014

1 commit


05 Jun, 2014

1 commit


07 Dec, 2013

1 commit

  • Several files refer to an old address for the Free Software Foundation
    in the file header comment. Resolve by replacing the address with
    the URL so that we do not have to keep
    updating the header comments anytime the address changes.

    CC: John Fastabend
    CC: Alex Duyck
    CC: Marcel Holtmann
    CC: Gustavo Padovan
    CC: Johan Hedberg
    CC: Jamal Hadi Salim
    Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

    Jeff Kirsher
     

13 Jul, 2013

1 commit


17 Dec, 2012

1 commit

  • Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
    "A quiet cycle for the security subsystem with just a few maintenance
    updates."

    * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
    Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs
    Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig
    Yama: remove locking from delete path
    Yama: add RCU to drop read locking
    drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup
    KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings
    KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
    KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread
    seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent
    key: Fix resource leak
    keys: Fix unreachable code
    KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update

    Linus Torvalds
     

15 Oct, 2012

1 commit

  • Pull module signing support from Rusty Russell:
    "module signing is the highlight, but it's an all-over David Howells frenzy..."

    Hmm "Magrathea: Glacier signing key". Somebody has been reading too much HHGTTG.

    * 'modules-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (37 commits)
    X.509: Fix indefinite length element skip error handling
    X.509: Convert some printk calls to pr_devel
    asymmetric keys: fix printk format warning
    MODSIGN: Fix 32-bit overflow in X.509 certificate validity date checking
    MODSIGN: Make mrproper should remove generated files.
    MODSIGN: Use utf8 strings in signer's name in autogenerated X.509 certs
    MODSIGN: Use the same digest for the autogen key sig as for the module sig
    MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process
    MODSIGN: Provide a script for generating a key ID from an X.509 cert
    MODSIGN: Implement module signature checking
    MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel
    MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing
    MODSIGN: Provide Kconfig options
    MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files
    MODSIGN: Add FIPS policy
    module: signature checking hook
    X.509: Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) X.509 certificates
    MPILIB: Provide a function to read raw data into an MPI
    X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder
    X.509: Add simple ASN.1 grammar compiler
    ...

    Linus Torvalds
     

08 Oct, 2012

1 commit

  • Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the
    instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the
    provision of two new key type operations:

    int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
    void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);

    If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in
    the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and
    instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first
    was called.

    preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure:

    struct key_preparsed_payload {
    char *description;
    void *type_data[2];
    void *payload;
    const void *data;
    size_t datalen;
    size_t quotalen;
    };

    Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared,
    the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default
    quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen.

    The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in
    the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update()
    ops.

    The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a
    string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or ""
    description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update()
    function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description
    to tell the upcall about the key to be created.

    This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own
    name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key.

    The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this:

    int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
    int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);

    and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell

    David Howells
     

03 Oct, 2012

2 commits


14 Sep, 2012

1 commit


13 Sep, 2012

1 commit

  • Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the
    instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the
    provision of two new key type operations:

    int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
    void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);

    If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in
    the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and
    instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first
    was called.

    preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure:

    struct key_preparsed_payload {
    char *description;
    void *type_data[2];
    void *payload;
    const void *data;
    size_t datalen;
    size_t quotalen;
    };

    Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared,
    the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default
    quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen.

    The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in
    the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update()
    ops.

    The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a
    string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or ""
    description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update()
    function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description
    to tell the upcall about the key to be created.

    This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own
    name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key.

    The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this:

    int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
    int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);

    and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells

    David Howells
     

22 May, 2012

1 commit

  • Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
    "New notable features:
    - The seccomp work from Will Drewry
    - PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski
    - Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler
    - Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook"

    Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h

    * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
    apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path
    apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined
    ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name
    KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()
    Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
    gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
    Smack: recursive tramsmute
    Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
    TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .
    KEYS: Add invalidation support
    KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
    KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list
    KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction
    KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration
    KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile
    KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig
    KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat
    Yama: remove an unused variable
    samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros
    Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
    ...

    Linus Torvalds
     

11 May, 2012

1 commit


16 Apr, 2012

1 commit


19 Jan, 2012

1 commit

  • The kernel contains some special internal keyrings, for instance the DNS
    resolver keyring :

    2a93faf1 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .dns_resolver: empty

    It would occasionally be useful to allow the contents of such keyrings to be
    flushed by root (cache invalidation).

    Allow a flag to be set on a keyring to mark that someone possessing the
    sysadmin capability can clear the keyring, even without normal write access to
    the keyring.

    Set this flag on the special keyrings created by the DNS resolver, the NFS
    identity mapper and the CIFS identity mapper.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: Jeff Layton
    Acked-by: Steve Dickson
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     

17 Mar, 2011

1 commit

  • Improve /proc/keys by:

    (1) Don't attempt to summarise the payload of a negated key. It won't have
    one. To this end, a helper function - key_is_instantiated() has been
    added that allows the caller to find out whether the key is positively
    instantiated (as opposed to being uninstantiated or negatively
    instantiated).

    (2) Do show keys that are negative, expired or revoked rather than hiding
    them. This requires an override flag (no_state_check) to be passed to
    search_my_process_keyrings() and keyring_search_aux() to suppress this
    check.

    Without this, keys that are possessed by the caller, but only grant
    permissions to the caller if possessed are skipped as the possession check
    fails.

    Keys that are visible due to user, group or other checks are visible with
    or without this patch.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     

04 Mar, 2011

1 commit

  • When a DNS resolver key is instantiated with an error indication, attempts to
    read that key will result in an oops because user_read() is expecting there to
    be a payload - and there isn't one [CVE-2011-1076].

    Give the DNS resolver key its own read handler that returns the error cached in
    key->type_data.x[0] as an error rather than crashing.

    Also make the kenter() at the beginning of dns_resolver_instantiate() limit the
    amount of data it prints, since the data is not necessarily NUL-terminated.

    The buggy code was added in:

    commit 4a2d789267e00b5a1175ecd2ddefcc78b83fbf09
    Author: Wang Lei
    Date: Wed Aug 11 09:37:58 2010 +0100
    Subject: DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]

    This can trivially be reproduced by any user with the following program
    compiled with -lkeyutils:

    #include
    #include
    #include
    static char payload[] = "#dnserror=6";
    int main()
    {
    key_serial_t key;
    key = add_key("dns_resolver", "a", payload, sizeof(payload),
    KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
    if (key == -1)
    err(1, "add_key");
    if (keyctl_read(key, NULL, 0) == -1)
    err(1, "read_key");
    return 0;
    }

    What should happen is that keyctl_read() reports error 6 (ENXIO) to the user:

    dns-break: read_key: No such device or address

    but instead the kernel oopses.

    This cannot be reproduced with the 'keyutils add' or 'keyutils padd' commands
    as both of those cut the data down below the NUL termination that must be
    included in the data. Without this dns_resolver_instantiate() will return
    -EINVAL and the key will not be instantiated such that it can be read.

    The oops looks like:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
    IP: [] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
    PGD 3bdf8067 PUD 385b9067 PMD 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
    last sysfs file: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:19.0/irq
    CPU 0
    Modules linked in:

    Pid: 2150, comm: dns-break Not tainted 2.6.38-rc7-cachefs+ #468 /DG965RY
    RIP: 0010:[] [] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
    RSP: 0018:ffff88003bf47f08 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88003b5ea378 RCX: ffffffff81972368
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88003b5ea378
    RBP: ffff88003bf47f28 R08: ffff88003be56620 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000395 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffffffffa1
    FS: 00007feab5751700(0000) GS:ffff88003e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000003de40000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Process dns-break (pid: 2150, threadinfo ffff88003bf46000, task ffff88003be56090)
    Stack:
    ffff88003b5ea378 ffff88003b5ea3a0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffff88003bf47f68 ffffffff811b708e ffff88003c442bc8 0000000000000000
    00000000004005a0 00007fffba368060 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    Call Trace:
    [] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf
    [] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb6
    [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
    Code: 75 1f 48 83 7b 28 00 75 18 c6 05 58 2b fb 00 01 be bb 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 76 1c 75 81 e8 13 c2 e9 ff 4c 8b b3 e0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed 0f b7 5e 10 74 2d 4d 85 e4 74 28 e8 98 79 ee ff 49 39 dd 48
    RIP [] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
    RSP
    CR2: 0000000000000010

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: Jeff Layton
    cc: Wang Lei
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     

23 Nov, 2010

1 commit


12 Aug, 2010

1 commit

  • If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached in the DNS resolver
    key in lieu of a value. Userspace passes the desired error number as an option
    in the payload:

    "#dnserror="

    Userspace must map h_errno from the name resolution routines to an appropriate
    Linux error before passing it up. Something like the following mapping is
    recommended:

    [HOST_NOT_FOUND] = ENODATA,
    [TRY_AGAIN] = EAGAIN,
    [NO_RECOVERY] = ECONNREFUSED,
    [NO_DATA] = ENODATA,

    in lieu of Linux errors specifically for representing name service errors. The
    filesystem must map these errors appropropriately before passing them to
    userspace. AFS is made to map ENODATA and EAGAIN to EDESTADDRREQ for the
    return to userspace; ECONNREFUSED is allowed to stand as is.

    The error can be seen in /proc/keys as a negative number after the description
    of the key. Compare, for example, the following key entries:

    2f97238c I--Q-- 1 53s 3f010000 0 0 dns_resol afsdb:grand.centrall.org: -61
    338bfbbe I--Q-- 1 59m 3f010000 0 0 dns_resol afsdb:grand.central.org: 37

    If the error option is supplied in the payload, the main part of the payload is
    discarded. The key should have an expiry time set by userspace.

    Signed-off-by: Wang Lei
    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: Jeff Layton
    Signed-off-by: Steve French

    Wang Lei
     

06 Aug, 2010

3 commits

  • CC: Dave Howells
    Signed-off-by: Steve French

    Steve French
     
  • Fixes for the DNS query module, including:

    (1) Use 'negative' instead of '-ve' in the documentation.

    (2) Mark the kdoc comment with '/**' on dns_query().

    Reported-by: Randy Dunlap
    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Steve French

    David Howells
     
  • Fixes build errors:

    net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c: In function 'init_dns_resolver':
    net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c:170: error: implicit declaration of function 'IS_ERR'
    net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c:171: error: implicit declaration of function 'PTR_ERR'
    net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c: In function 'dns_query':
    net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c:126: error: implicit declaration of function 'IS_ERR'
    net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c:127: error: implicit declaration of function 'PTR_ERR'

    Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell
    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Steve French

    Stephen Rothwell