02 Nov, 2017

1 commit

  • Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
    makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

    By default all files without license information are under the default
    license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

    Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
    SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
    shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

    This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
    Philippe Ombredanne.

    How this work was done:

    Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
    the use cases:
    - file had no licensing information it it.
    - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
    - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

    Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
    where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
    had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

    The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
    a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
    output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
    tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
    base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

    The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
    assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
    results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
    to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
    immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

    Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
    - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
    - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
    lines of source
    - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if
    Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne
    Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

    Greg Kroah-Hartman
     

14 May, 2010

1 commit

  • Redirecting directly to lsm, here's the patch discussed on lkml:
    http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/4/22/219

    The mmap_min_addr value is useful information for an admin to see without
    being root ("is my system vulnerable to kernel NULL pointer attacks?") and
    its setting is trivially easy for an attacker to determine by calling
    mmap() in PAGE_SIZE increments starting at 0, so trying to keep it private
    has no value.

    Only require CAP_SYS_RAWIO if changing the value, not reading it.

    Comment from Serge :

    Me, I like to write my passwords with light blue pen on dark blue
    paper, pasted on my window - if you're going to get my password, you're
    gonna get a headache.

    Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris
    (cherry picked from commit 822cceec7248013821d655545ea45d1c6a9d15b3)

    Kees Cook
     

17 Dec, 2009

1 commit


09 Nov, 2009

1 commit

  • Currently the mmap_min_addr value can only be bypassed during mmap when
    the task has CAP_SYS_RAWIO. However, the mmap_min_addr sysctl value itself
    can be adjusted to 0 if euid == 0, allowing a bypass without CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
    This patch adds a check for the capability before allowing mmap_min_addr to
    be changed.

    Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Kees Cook
     

24 Sep, 2009

1 commit

  • It's unused.

    It isn't needed -- read or write flag is already passed and sysctl
    shouldn't care about the rest.

    It _was_ used in two places at arch/frv for some reason.

    Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
    Cc: David Howells
    Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
    Cc: Al Viro
    Cc: Ralf Baechle
    Cc: Martin Schwidefsky
    Cc: Ingo Molnar
    Cc: "David S. Miller"
    Cc: James Morris
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Alexey Dobriyan
     

17 Aug, 2009

1 commit

  • Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
    is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to
    ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
    much space the LSM should protect.

    The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
    permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
    CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

    This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
    being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
    controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
    map some area of low memory.

    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Eric Paris