Eric Lee / smarc-ti-linux-kernel

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Commit 33b25335184b33dafddb4a83c27270947e525641

Authored by James Morris
2 parents d4a141c8e7 a3aef94b31
Exists in master and in 13 other branches dlt-processor-sdk-linux-03.00.00.04, processor-sdk-linux-02.00.01, smarc-ti-linux-3.15.y, smarc-ti-lsk-linux-4.1.y, smarct3x-processor-sdk-04.01.00.06, smarct3x-processor-sdk-linux-02.00.01, smarct3x-processor-sdk-linux-03.00.00.04, smarct4x-800-processor-sdk-linux-02.00.01, smarct4x-processor-sdk-04.01.00.06, smarct4x-processor-sdk-linux-02.00.01, smarct4x-processor-sdk-linux-03.00.00.04, ti-linux-3.15.y, ti-lsk-linux-4.1.y

Merge branch 'next-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar… 

…/linux-integrity into next

Showing 20 changed files Side-by-side Diff

... ... @@ -3325,7 +3325,9 @@
3325 3325 F: fs/ext4/
3326 3326  
3327 3327 Extended Verification Module (EVM)
3328   -M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
  3328 +M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
  3329 +L: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
  3330 +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
3329 3331 S: Supported
3330 3332 F: security/integrity/evm/
3331 3333  
3332 3334  
... ... @@ -4339,8 +4341,11 @@
4339 4341 F: drivers/ipack/
4340 4342  
4341 4343 INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA)
4342   -M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
  4344 +M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
4343 4345 M: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
  4346 +L: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
  4347 +L: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
  4348 +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
4344 4349 S: Supported
4345 4350 F: security/integrity/ima/
4346 4351  
... ... @@ -5003,8 +5008,8 @@
5003 5008 F: security/keys/
5004 5009  
5005 5010 KEYS-TRUSTED
5006   -M: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
5007   -M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
  5011 +M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
  5012 +M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
5008 5013 L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
5009 5014 L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
5010 5015 S: Supported
... ... @@ -5014,8 +5019,8 @@
5014 5019 F: security/keys/trusted.h
5015 5020  
5016 5021 KEYS-ENCRYPTED
5017   -M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5018   -M: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
  5022 +M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
  5023 +M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
5019 5024 L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
5020 5025 L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
5021 5026 S: Supported
... ... @@ -586,6 +586,9 @@
586 586 atomic_t i_count;
587 587 atomic_t i_dio_count;
588 588 atomic_t i_writecount;
  589 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
  590 + atomic_t i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
  591 +#endif
589 592 const struct file_operations *i_fop; /* former ->i_op->default_file_ops */
590 593 struct file_lock *i_flock;
591 594 struct address_space i_data;
... ... @@ -606,9 +609,6 @@
606 609 struct hlist_head i_fsnotify_marks;
607 610 #endif
608 611  
609   -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
610   - atomic_t i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
611   -#endif
612 612 void *i_private; /* fs or device private pointer */
613 613 };
614 614  
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
1 1 config EVM
2 2 boolean "EVM support"
3   - depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)
  3 + depends on SECURITY
  4 + select KEYS
  5 + select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
4 6 select CRYPTO_HMAC
5   - select CRYPTO_MD5
6 7 select CRYPTO_SHA1
7   - select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
8 8 default n
9 9 help
10 10 EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
security/integrity/evm/evm.h
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -32,20 +32,20 @@
32 32 /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
33 33 extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
34 34  
35   -extern int evm_init_key(void);
36   -extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
37   - const char *req_xattr_name,
38   - const char *req_xattr_value,
39   - size_t req_xattr_value_len);
40   -extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
41   - const char *req_xattr_value,
42   - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
43   -extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
44   - const char *req_xattr_value,
45   - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
46   -extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
47   - char *hmac_val);
48   -extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
  35 +int evm_init_key(void);
  36 +int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
  37 + const char *req_xattr_name,
  38 + const char *req_xattr_value,
  39 + size_t req_xattr_value_len);
  40 +int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
  41 + const char *req_xattr_value,
  42 + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
  43 +int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
  44 + const char *req_xattr_value,
  45 + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
  46 +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
  47 + char *hmac_val);
  48 +int evm_init_secfs(void);
49 49  
50 50 #endif
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
13 13 * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
14 14 */
15 15  
  16 +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  17 +
16 18 #include <linux/module.h>
17 19 #include <linux/crypto.h>
18 20 #include <linux/xattr.h>
19 21  
... ... @@ -103,13 +105,13 @@
103 105 umode_t mode;
104 106 } hmac_misc;
105 107  
106   - memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
  108 + memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
107 109 hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
108 110 hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
109 111 hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
110 112 hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
111 113 hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
112   - crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
  114 + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
113 115 if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
114 116 crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
115 117 sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
... ... @@ -221,7 +223,7 @@
221 223  
222 224 desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
223 225 if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
224   - printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
  226 + pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
225 227 return PTR_ERR(desc);
226 228 }
227 229  
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
14 14 * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
15 15 */
16 16  
  17 +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  18 +
17 19 #include <linux/module.h>
18 20 #include <linux/crypto.h>
19 21 #include <linux/audit.h>
... ... @@ -432,7 +434,7 @@
432 434  
433 435 error = evm_init_secfs();
434 436 if (error < 0) {
435   - printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n");
  437 + pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
436 438 goto err;
437 439 }
438 440  
... ... @@ -449,7 +451,7 @@
449 451 char **xattrname;
450 452  
451 453 for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++)
452   - printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname);
  454 + pr_info("%s\n", *xattrname);
453 455 return 0;
454 456 }
455 457  
security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
13 13 * - Get the key and enable EVM
14 14 */
15 15  
  16 +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  17 +
16 18 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
17 19 #include <linux/module.h>
18 20 #include "evm.h"
19 21  
... ... @@ -79,9 +81,9 @@
79 81 error = evm_init_key();
80 82 if (!error) {
81 83 evm_initialized = 1;
82   - pr_info("EVM: initialized\n");
  84 + pr_info("initialized\n");
83 85 } else
84   - pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n");
  86 + pr_err("initialization failed\n");
85 87 return count;
86 88 }
87 89  
security/integrity/iint.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
151 151 {
152 152 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
153 153  
154   - memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
  154 + memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
155 155 iint->version = 0;
156 156 iint->flags = 0UL;
157 157 iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
27 27 #include "../integrity.h"
28 28  
29 29 enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
30   - IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
  30 + IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
31 31 enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
32 32  
33 33 /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -92,8 +92,8 @@
92 92 int violation, struct inode *inode,
93 93 const unsigned char *filename)
94 94 {
95   - const char *op = "add_template_measure";
96   - const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
  95 + static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
  96 + static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
97 97 char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
98 98 int result;
99 99 struct {
... ... @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
132 132 const char *op, const char *cause)
133 133 {
134 134 struct ima_template_entry *entry;
135   - struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
  135 + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
136 136 int violation = 1;
137 137 int result;
138 138  
139 139  
... ... @@ -160,10 +160,10 @@
160 160 * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
161 161 *
162 162 * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
163   - * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  163 + * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
164 164 * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
165   - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
166   - * mask: contains the permission mask
  165 + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
  166 + * mask: contains the permission mask
167 167 * fsmagic: hex value
168 168 *
169 169 * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
... ... @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
248 248 *
249 249 * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
250 250 * but the measurement could already exist:
251   - * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
  251 + * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
252 252 * different filesystems.
253 253 * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
254 254 * containing the hashing info.
... ... @@ -260,8 +260,8 @@
260 260 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
261 261 int xattr_len)
262 262 {
263   - const char *op = "add_template_measure";
264   - const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
  263 + static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
  264 + static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
265 265 int result = -ENOMEM;
266 266 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
267 267 struct ima_template_entry *entry;
... ... @@ -332,6 +332,6 @@
332 332 pathname = NULL;
333 333 }
334 334 }
335   - return pathname;
  335 + return pathname ?: (const char *)path->dentry->d_name.name;
336 336 }
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -177,11 +177,11 @@
177 177 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
178 178 int xattr_len)
179 179 {
  180 + static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
  181 + char *cause = "unknown";
180 182 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
181 183 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
182 184 enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
183   - const char *op = "appraise_data";
184   - char *cause = "unknown";
185 185 int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
186 186  
187 187 if (!ima_appraise)
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -10,9 +10,11 @@
10 10 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
11 11 *
12 12 * File: ima_crypto.c
13   - * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
  13 + * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
14 14 */
15 15  
  16 +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  17 +
16 18 #include <linux/kernel.h>
17 19 #include <linux/file.h>
18 20 #include <linux/crypto.h>
19 21  
20 22  
... ... @@ -85,16 +87,20 @@
85 87 if (rc != 0)
86 88 return rc;
87 89  
88   - rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
89   - if (!rbuf) {
90   - rc = -ENOMEM;
  90 + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
  91 +
  92 + if (i_size == 0)
91 93 goto out;
92   - }
  94 +
  95 + rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
  96 + if (!rbuf)
  97 + return -ENOMEM;
  98 +
93 99 if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
94 100 file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
95 101 read = 1;
96 102 }
97   - i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
  103 +
98 104 while (offset < i_size) {
99 105 int rbuf_len;
100 106  
101 107  
102 108  
... ... @@ -111,12 +117,12 @@
111 117 if (rc)
112 118 break;
113 119 }
114   - kfree(rbuf);
115   - if (!rc)
116   - rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
117 120 if (read)
118 121 file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
  122 + kfree(rbuf);
119 123 out:
  124 + if (!rc)
  125 + rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
120 126 return rc;
121 127 }
122 128  
123 129  
124 130  
... ... @@ -161,15 +167,22 @@
161 167 return rc;
162 168  
163 169 for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
  170 + u8 buffer[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1] = { 0 };
  171 + u8 *data_to_hash = field_data[i].data;
  172 + u32 datalen = field_data[i].len;
  173 +
164 174 if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
165 175 rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
166 176 (const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
167 177 sizeof(field_data[i].len));
168 178 if (rc)
169 179 break;
  180 + } else if (strcmp(td->fields[i]->field_id, "n") == 0) {
  181 + memcpy(buffer, data_to_hash, datalen);
  182 + data_to_hash = buffer;
  183 + datalen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
170 184 }
171   - rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data,
172   - field_data[i].len);
  185 + rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, data_to_hash, datalen);
173 186 if (rc)
174 187 break;
175 188 }
... ... @@ -205,7 +218,7 @@
205 218 return;
206 219  
207 220 if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
208   - pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
  221 + pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
209 222 }
210 223  
211 224 /*
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -133,14 +133,14 @@
133 133 * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
134 134 * little-endian format
135 135 */
136   - ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
  136 + ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
137 137  
138 138 /* 2nd: template digest */
139 139 ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
140 140  
141 141 /* 3rd: template name size */
142 142 namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
143   - ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
  143 + ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
144 144  
145 145 /* 4th: template name */
146 146 ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
... ... @@ -160,6 +160,8 @@
160 160  
161 161 if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
162 162 show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
  163 + if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0)
  164 + show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT;
163 165 field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]);
164 166 }
165 167 return 0;
... ... @@ -290,7 +292,7 @@
290 292 /*
291 293 * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
292 294 */
293   -static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
  295 +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
294 296 {
295 297 /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
296 298 if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
14 14 * File: ima_init.c
15 15 * initialization and cleanup functions
16 16 */
  17 +
  18 +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  19 +
17 20 #include <linux/module.h>
18 21 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
19 22 #include <linux/slab.h>
20 23  
... ... @@ -42,10 +45,10 @@
42 45 */
43 46 static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
44 47 {
  48 + static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
  49 + const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
45 50 struct ima_template_entry *entry;
46 51 struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
47   - const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
48   - const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
49 52 int result = -ENOMEM;
50 53 int violation = 0;
51 54 struct {
... ... @@ -93,7 +96,7 @@
93 96 ima_used_chip = 1;
94 97  
95 98 if (!ima_used_chip)
96   - pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
  99 + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
97 100  
98 101 rc = ima_init_crypto();
99 102 if (rc)
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -71,15 +71,14 @@
71 71 * ima_rdwr_violation_check
72 72 *
73 73 * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
74   - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
  74 + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
75 75 * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
76 76 * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
77   - * could result in a file measurement error.
  77 + * could result in a file measurement error.
78 78 *
79 79 */
80 80 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
81 81 {
82   - struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
83 82 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
84 83 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
85 84 int must_measure;
... ... @@ -111,8 +110,6 @@
111 110 return;
112 111  
113 112 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
114   - if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
115   - pathname = dentry->d_name.name;
116 113  
117 114 if (send_tomtou)
118 115 ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
... ... @@ -220,9 +217,7 @@
220 217 if (rc != 0)
221 218 goto out_digsig;
222 219  
223   - pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename;
224   - if (!pathname)
225   - pathname = (const char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
  220 + pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
226 221  
227 222 if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
228 223 ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
7 7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
8 8 *
9 9 * ima_policy.c
10   - * - initialize default measure policy rules
  10 + * - initialize default measure policy rules
11 11 *
12 12 */
13 13 #include <linux/module.h>
... ... @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
21 21 #include "ima.h"
22 22  
23 23 /* flags definitions */
24   -#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
25   -#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
  24 +#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
  25 +#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
26 26 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
27 27 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
28 28 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
29 29  
30 30  
31 31  
32 32  
... ... @@ -69,35 +69,35 @@
69 69 * and running executables.
70 70 */
71 71 static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
72   - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
73   - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
74   - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
75   - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
76   - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
77   - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
78   - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
79   - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
80   - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
  72 + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  73 + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  74 + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  75 + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  76 + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  77 + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  78 + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  79 + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  80 + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
81 81 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
82   - {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
  82 + {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
83 83 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
84   - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
  84 + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
85 85 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
86   - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
  86 + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
87 87 };
88 88  
89 89 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
90   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
91   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
92   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
93   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
94   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
95   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
96   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
97   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
98   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
99   - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
100   - {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
  90 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  91 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  92 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  93 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  94 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  95 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  96 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  97 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  98 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  99 + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  100 + {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
101 101 };
102 102  
103 103 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
104 104  
... ... @@ -122,12 +122,12 @@
122 122 }
123 123 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
124 124  
125   -/*
  125 +/*
126 126 * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
127 127 * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
128 128 * stale LSM policy.
129 129 *
130   - * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
  130 + * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
131 131 * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
132 132 */
133 133 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
134 134  
... ... @@ -167,9 +167,11 @@
167 167 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
168 168 int i;
169 169  
170   - if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
  170 + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
  171 + (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
171 172 return false;
172   - if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
  173 + if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
  174 + (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
173 175 return false;
174 176 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
175 177 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
... ... @@ -216,7 +218,7 @@
216 218 retried = 1;
217 219 ima_lsm_update_rules();
218 220 goto retry;
219   - }
  221 + }
220 222 if (!rc)
221 223 return false;
222 224 }
... ... @@ -232,7 +234,7 @@
232 234 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
233 235 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
234 236  
235   - switch(func) {
  237 + switch (func) {
236 238 case MMAP_CHECK:
237 239 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
238 240 case BPRM_CHECK:
... ... @@ -304,7 +306,7 @@
304 306 measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
305 307 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
306 308 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
307   -
  309 +
308 310 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
309 311 if (i < measure_entries)
310 312 list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
... ... @@ -329,7 +331,7 @@
329 331 */
330 332 void ima_update_policy(void)
331 333 {
332   - const char *op = "policy_update";
  334 + static const char op[] = "policy_update";
333 335 const char *cause = "already exists";
334 336 int result = 1;
335 337 int audit_info = 0;
... ... @@ -520,8 +522,7 @@
520 522 break;
521 523 }
522 524  
523   - result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16,
524   - &entry->fsmagic);
  525 + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
525 526 if (!result)
526 527 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
527 528 break;
... ... @@ -645,7 +646,7 @@
645 646 */
646 647 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
647 648 {
648   - const char *op = "update_policy";
  649 + static const char op[] = "update_policy";
649 650 char *p;
650 651 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
651 652 ssize_t result, len;
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
18 18 * The measurement list is append-only. No entry is
19 19 * ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle.
20 20 */
  21 +
  22 +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  23 +
21 24 #include <linux/module.h>
22 25 #include <linux/rculist.h>
23 26 #include <linux/slab.h>
... ... @@ -72,7 +75,7 @@
72 75  
73 76 qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL);
74 77 if (qe == NULL) {
75   - pr_err("IMA: OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
  78 + pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry\n");
76 79 return -ENOMEM;
77 80 }
78 81 qe->entry = entry;
... ... @@ -95,8 +98,7 @@
95 98  
96 99 result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
97 100 if (result != 0)
98   - pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n",
99   - result);
  101 + pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
100 102 return result;
101 103 }
102 104  
... ... @@ -115,7 +117,7 @@
115 117  
116 118 mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
117 119 if (!violation) {
118   - memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
  120 + memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
119 121 if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
120 122 audit_cause = "hash_exists";
121 123 result = -EEXIST;
... ... @@ -131,7 +133,7 @@
131 133 }
132 134  
133 135 if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */
134   - memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
  136 + memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
135 137  
136 138 tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
137 139 if (tpmresult != 0) {
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
12 12 * File: ima_template.c
13 13 * Helpers to manage template descriptors.
14 14 */
  15 +
  16 +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  17 +
15 18 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
16 19  
17 20 #include "ima.h"
18 21  
19 22  
20 23  
21 24  
22 25  
... ... @@ -19,20 +22,20 @@
19 22  
20 23 static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
21 24 {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
22   - {.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
23   - {.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
  25 + {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
  26 + {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
24 27 };
25 28  
26 29 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
27   - {.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
  30 + {.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
28 31 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
29   - {.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
  32 + {.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
30 33 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
31   - {.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
  34 + {.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
32 35 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
33   - {.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
  36 + {.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
34 37 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
35   - {.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
  38 + {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
36 39 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
37 40 };
38 41  
... ... @@ -58,7 +61,7 @@
58 61 */
59 62 if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 &&
60 63 ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) {
61   - pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n");
  64 + pr_err("template does not support hash alg\n");
62 65 return 1;
63 66 }
64 67  
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
27 27 enum data_formats {
28 28 DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
29 29 DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
30   - DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME,
31 30 DATA_FMT_STRING,
32 31 DATA_FMT_HEX
33 32 };
34 33  
35 34  
... ... @@ -37,18 +36,10 @@
37 36 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
38 37 {
39 38 u8 *buf, *buf_ptr;
40   - u32 buflen;
  39 + u32 buflen = datalen;
41 40  
42   - switch (datafmt) {
43   - case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME:
44   - buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
45   - break;
46   - case DATA_FMT_STRING:
  41 + if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING)
47 42 buflen = datalen + 1;
48   - break;
49   - default:
50   - buflen = datalen;
51   - }
52 43  
53 44 buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
54 45 if (!buf)
... ... @@ -63,7 +54,7 @@
63 54 * split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator
64 55 * character for measurements lists in ASCII format).
65 56 */
66   - if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
  57 + if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
67 58 for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++)
68 59 if (*buf_ptr == ' ')
69 60 *buf_ptr = '_';
70 61  
71 62  
72 63  
... ... @@ -109,13 +100,16 @@
109 100 enum data_formats datafmt,
110 101 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
111 102 {
  103 + u32 len = (show == IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT) ?
  104 + strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len;
  105 +
112 106 if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN)
113   - ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
  107 + ima_putc(m, &len, sizeof(len));
114 108  
115   - if (!field_data->len)
  109 + if (!len)
116 110 return;
117 111  
118   - ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
  112 + ima_putc(m, field_data->data, len);
119 113 }
120 114  
121 115 static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
... ... @@ -129,6 +123,7 @@
129 123 break;
130 124 case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
131 125 case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN:
  126 + case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT:
132 127 ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
133 128 break;
134 129 default:
... ... @@ -277,8 +272,6 @@
277 272 {
278 273 const char *cur_filename = NULL;
279 274 u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
280   - enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ?
281   - DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING;
282 275  
283 276 BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
284 277  
... ... @@ -301,7 +294,7 @@
301 294 cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
302 295 out:
303 296 return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
304   - fmt, field_data);
  297 + DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
305 298 }
306 299  
307 300 /*
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
Diff comments   View file @ 33b2533
... ... @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
7 7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
8 8 *
9 9 * File: integrity_audit.c
10   - * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
  10 + * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
11 11 */
12 12  
13 13 #include <linux/fs.h>
... ... @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
33 33 const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
34 34 {
35 35 struct audit_buffer *ab;
  36 + char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
36 37  
37 38 if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */
38 39 return;
... ... @@ -49,7 +50,7 @@
49 50 audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
50 51 audit_log_string(ab, cause);
51 52 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
52   - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
  53 + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current));
53 54 if (fname) {
54 55 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
55 56 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);