Commit 75e1c70fc31490ef8a373ea2a4bea2524099b478

Authored by Jeff Moyer
Committed by Linus Torvalds
1 parent bfa88ea7ee

aio: check for multiplication overflow in do_io_submit

Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds
checking on the passed-in iocb array:

       if (unlikely(nr < 0))
               return -EINVAL;

       if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp)))))
               return -EFAULT;                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the
number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in
the long.  This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as
returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a
return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in.

Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Showing 1 changed file with 3 additions and 0 deletions Side-by-side Diff

... ... @@ -1659,6 +1659,9 @@
1659 1659 if (unlikely(nr < 0))
1660 1660 return -EINVAL;
1661 1661  
  1662 + if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
  1663 + nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
  1664 +
1662 1665 if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
1663 1666 return -EFAULT;
1664 1667