Commit bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962

Authored by Stephen Smalley
Committed by Linus Torvalds
1 parent b599fdfdb4

[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes

Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve).  So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below.  Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over
them.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Showing 1 changed file with 3 additions and 0 deletions Side-by-side Diff

security/selinux/hooks.c
... ... @@ -1077,6 +1077,9 @@
1077 1077 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1078 1078 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1079 1079  
  1080 + if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
  1081 + return 0;
  1082 +
1080 1083 tsec = tsk->security;
1081 1084 isec = inode->i_security;
1082 1085