Commit f0cc6ffb8ce8961db587e5072168cac0cbc25f05

Authored by Linus Torvalds
1 parent fa8218def1

Revert "fs: Allow unprivileged linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) aka flink"

This reverts commit bb2314b47996491bbc5add73633905c3120b6268.

It wasn't necessarily wrong per se, but we're still busily discussing
the exact details of this all, so I'm going to revert it for now.

It's true that you can already do flink() through /proc and that flink()
isn't new.  But as Brad Spengler points out, some secure environments do
not mount proc, and flink adds a new interface that can avoid path
lookup of the source for those kinds of environments.

We may re-do this (and even mark it for stable backporting back in 3.11
and possibly earlier) once the whole discussion about the interface is done.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Showing 1 changed file with 7 additions and 3 deletions Side-by-side Diff

... ... @@ -3671,11 +3671,15 @@
3671 3671 if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
3672 3672 return -EINVAL;
3673 3673 /*
3674   - * Using empty names is equivalent to using AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW
3675   - * on /proc/self/fd/<fd>.
  3674 + * To use null names we require CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
  3675 + * This ensures that not everyone will be able to create
  3676 + * handlink using the passed filedescriptor.
3676 3677 */
3677   - if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
  3678 + if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH) {
  3679 + if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
  3680 + return -ENOENT;
3678 3681 how = LOOKUP_EMPTY;
  3682 + }
3679 3683  
3680 3684 if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW)
3681 3685 how |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;