04 Mar, 2016
1 commit
-
commit 3dfb7d8cdbc7ea0c2970450e60818bb3eefbad69 upstream.
It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.Signed-off-by: Jann Horn
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Cc: James Morris
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Cc: Andy Shevchenko
Cc: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Willy Tarreau
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
26 Feb, 2016
1 commit
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commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secretTherefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Cc: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Cc: James Morris
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Cc: Andy Shevchenko
Cc: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Willy Tarreau
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
18 Feb, 2016
1 commit
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commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream.
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
01 Feb, 2016
1 commit
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commit 23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2 upstream.
This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.This can be tested with the following program:
#include
#include
#include
#includeint main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int i = 0;
key_serial_t serial;serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
}return 0;
}If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Don Zickus
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
19 Dec, 2015
1 commit
-
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:#include
#include
#include
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6fReported-by: Dmitry Vyukov
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris
26 Nov, 2015
1 commit
25 Nov, 2015
2 commits
-
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @uwhich manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[] [] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @uThis should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
commit fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
introduced a bug into the handling of conditional rules, skipping the
processing entirely when the caller does not provide an extended
permissions (xperms) structure. Access checks from userspace using
/sys/fs/selinux/access do not include such a structure since that
interface does not presently expose extended permission information.
As a result, conditional rules were being ignored entirely on userspace
access requests, producing denials when access was allowed by
conditional rules in the policy. Fix the bug by only skipping
computation of extended permissions in this situation, not the entire
conditional rules processing.Reported-by: Laurent Bigonville
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
[PM: fixed long lines in patch description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
11 Nov, 2015
1 commit
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Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet.
2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK
packets, most spots got this ok but some were not. Whilst covering
the remaining cases, create a helper to do this. From Eric Dumazet.3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code,
from Rasmus Villemoes.4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich.
5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard.
6) Fix race on dst->flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver. From Arnd
Bergmann.8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong.
9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak.
10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6
counter state. From Sabrina Dubroca.11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from
Francesco Ruggeri.12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes,
from Jarod Wilson.13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other
userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich.* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits)
Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled"
bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS
qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE
net: fix a race in dst_release()
net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free.
net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes
macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read()
mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency
net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev
net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA
drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode
netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT
dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put"
bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure
...
09 Nov, 2015
2 commits
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This module wants to access sk->sk_security, which is not
available for request sockets.Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -
Generalize selinux_skb_sk() added in commit 212cd0895330
("selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()")
so that we can use it other contexts.Use it right away in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
07 Nov, 2015
1 commit
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__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and
could not sleep. Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic
context and callers that are not willing to sleep. The latter should
clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake. As clearing
__GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the
wrong flags. This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly
indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing
them prevents it.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman
Acked-by: Michal Hocko
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner
Cc: Christoph Lameter
Acked-by: David Rientjes
Cc: Vitaly Wool
Cc: Rik van Riel
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
06 Nov, 2015
2 commits
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Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a
notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a
maintainer of that"* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits)
apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency
selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct
selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static
selinux: use sprintf return value
selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()
selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()
selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()
selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid
selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call
selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default
KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature
KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file
keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used
certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key
Smack: limited capability for changing process label
TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion
vTPM: support little endian guests
char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver
... -
In commit e446f9dfe17b ("net: synack packets can be attached to request
sockets"), I missed one remaining case of invalid skb->sk->sk_security
access.Dmitry Vyukov got a KASan report pointing to it.
Add selinux_skb_sk() helper that is responsible to get back to the
listener if skb is attached to a request socket, instead of
duplicating the logic.Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov
Cc: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
01 Nov, 2015
1 commit
23 Oct, 2015
1 commit
-
…dhowells/linux-fs into next
22 Oct, 2015
11 commits
-
The crypto framework can be built as a loadable module, but the
apparmor hash code can only be built-in, which then causes a
link error:security/built-in.o: In function `aa_calc_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.text+0x21610): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update'
security/built-in.o: In function `init_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.init.text+0xb4c): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash'This changes Apparmor to use 'select CRYPTO' like a lot of other
subsystems do.Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann
Acked-by: John Johansen
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The size of struct file_security_struct is 16byte at my setup.
But, the real allocation size for per each file_security_struct
is 64bytes in my setup that kmalloc min size is 64bytes
because ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 64.This allocation is called every times at file allocation(alloc_file()).
So, the total slack memory size(allocated size - request size)
is increased exponentially.E.g) Min Kmalloc Size : 64bytes, Unit : bytes
Allocated Size | Request Size | Slack Size | Allocation Count
---------------------------------------------------------------
770048 | 192512 | 577536 | 12032At the result, this change reduce memory usage 42bytes per each
file_security_structSigned-off-by: Sangwoo
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
[PM: removed extra subject prefix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore -
Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:3242:5: warning: symbol 'ioctl_has_perm' was
not declared. Should it be static?Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore -
sprintf returns the number of characters printed (excluding '\0'), so
we can use that and avoid duplicating the length computation.Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore -
This is much simpler.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore -
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore -
security_context_to_sid() expects a const char* argument, so there's
no point in casting away the const qualifier of value.Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore -
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len
parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or
not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the
expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test
for scontext_len being zero hint at that).Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen()
call and fix all callers.Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore -
Use the ATTR_FILE attribute to distinguish between truncate()
and ftruncate() system calls. The two other cases where
do_truncate is called with a filp (and therefore ATTR_FILE is set)
are for coredump files and for open(O_TRUNC). In both of those cases
the open permission has already been checked during file open and
therefore does not need to be repeated.Commit 95dbf739313f ("SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls")
fixed a major issue where domains were allowed to truncate files
without the open permission. However, it introduced a new bug where
a domain with the write permission can no longer ftruncate files
without the open permission, even when they receive an already open
file.Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore -
Change the SELinux checkreqprot default value to 0 so that SELinux
performs access control checking on the actual memory protections
used by the kernel and not those requested by the application.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
21 Oct, 2015
4 commits
-
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.Signed-off-by: David Howells
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net -
key->description and key->index_key.description are same because
they are unioned. But, for readability, using same name for
duplication and validation seems better.Signed-off-by: Insu Yun
Signed-off-by: David Howells -
There is no need to make a flag to tell that this memory is allocated by
kmalloc or vmalloc. Just use kvfree to free the memory.Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang
Signed-off-by: David Howells
20 Oct, 2015
2 commits
-
This feature introduces new kernel interface:
- /relabel-self - for setting transition labels list
This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txtChanges in v3:
* squashed into one commitChanges in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on itChanges in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
replace the previous list upon writeSigned-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
19 Oct, 2015
3 commits
-
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.Now the kernel gives an error:
request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
Signed-off-by: David Howells
-
Call tpm_seal_trusted() and tpm_unseal_trusted() for TPM 2.0 chips.
We require explicit 'keyhandle=' option because there's no a fixed
storage root key inside TPM2 chips.Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Reviewed-by: Andreas Fuchs
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar (on TPM 1.2)
Tested-by: Chris J Arges
Tested-by: Colin Ian King
Tested-by: Kevin Strasser
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe -
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields
can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm.Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe
17 Oct, 2015
2 commits
-
This merge resolves conflicts with 75aec9df3a78 ("bridge: Remove
br_nf_push_frag_xmit_sk") as part of Eric Biederman's effort to improve
netns support in the network stack that reached upstream via David's
net-next tree.Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso
Conflicts:
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c -
since commit 8405a8fff3f8 ("netfilter: nf_qeueue: Drop queue entries on
nf_unregister_hook") all pending queued entries are discarded.So we can simply remove all of the owner handling -- when module is
removed it also needs to unregister all its hooks.Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso
16 Oct, 2015
1 commit
-
The following sequence of commands:
i=`keyctl add user a a @s`
keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t
keyctl unlink $i @stries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already
exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall
fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some
other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy
function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty()
on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error.
Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names
list - which oopses like this:BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
...
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
...
RIP: 0010:[] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40
RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000
...
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
...
Call Trace:
[] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f
[] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351
[] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547
[] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361
[] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8
[] kthread+0xf3/0xfb
[] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
[] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY.
The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully
instantiated.Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov
11 Oct, 2015
1 commit
-
selinux needs few changes to accommodate fact that SYNACK messages
can be attached to a request socket, lacking sk_security pointer(Only syncookies are still attached to a TCP_LISTEN socket)
Adds a new sk_listener() helper, and use it in selinux and sch_fq
Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet
Reported by: kernel test robot
Cc: Paul Moore
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller