Commit 4906e50b37e6f6c264e7ee4237343eb2b7f8d16d

Authored by Pavel Shilovsky
Committed by Steve French
1 parent f0e615c3cb

CIFS: Fix memory over bound bug in cifs_parse_mount_options

While password processing we can get out of options array bound if
the next character after array is delimiter. The patch adds a check
if we reach the end.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Showing 1 changed file with 3 additions and 2 deletions Side-by-side Diff

... ... @@ -807,8 +807,7 @@
807 807 cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
808 808 struct smb_vol *vol)
809 809 {
810   - char *value;
811   - char *data;
  810 + char *value, *data, *end;
812 811 unsigned int temp_len, i, j;
813 812 char separator[2];
814 813 short int override_uid = -1;
... ... @@ -851,6 +850,7 @@
851 850 if (!options)
852 851 return 1;
853 852  
  853 + end = options + strlen(options);
854 854 if (strncmp(options, "sep=", 4) == 0) {
855 855 if (options[4] != 0) {
856 856 separator[0] = options[4];
... ... @@ -916,6 +916,7 @@
916 916 the only illegal character in a password is null */
917 917  
918 918 if ((value[temp_len] == 0) &&
  919 + (value + temp_len < end) &&
919 920 (value[temp_len+1] == separator[0])) {
920 921 /* reinsert comma */
921 922 value[temp_len] = separator[0];