Commit ab6a44ce1da48d35fe7ec95fa068aa617bd7e8dd
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d2ac49fe3c
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Revert "mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices"
This reverts commit aac6af5534fade2b18682a0b9efad1a6c04c34c6. Conflicts: net/mac80211/key.c That commit has a race that causes a warning, as documented in the thread here: http://marc.info/?l=linux-wireless&m=130717684914101&w=2 Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Showing 3 changed files with 8 additions and 23 deletions Side-by-side Diff
net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
| ... | ... | @@ -775,9 +775,6 @@ |
| 775 | 775 | |
| 776 | 776 | int tx_headroom; /* required headroom for hardware/radiotap */ |
| 777 | 777 | |
| 778 | - /* count for keys needing tailroom space allocation */ | |
| 779 | - int crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt; | |
| 780 | - | |
| 781 | 778 | /* Tasklet and skb queue to process calls from IRQ mode. All frames |
| 782 | 779 | * added to skb_queue will be processed, but frames in |
| 783 | 780 | * skb_queue_unreliable may be dropped if the total length of these |
net/mac80211/key.c
| ... | ... | @@ -101,11 +101,6 @@ |
| 101 | 101 | |
| 102 | 102 | if (!ret) { |
| 103 | 103 | key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; |
| 104 | - | |
| 105 | - if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) || | |
| 106 | - (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV))) | |
| 107 | - key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--; | |
| 108 | - | |
| 109 | 104 | return 0; |
| 110 | 105 | } |
| 111 | 106 | |
| ... | ... | @@ -161,10 +156,6 @@ |
| 161 | 156 | key->conf.keyidx, sta ? sta->addr : bcast_addr, ret); |
| 162 | 157 | |
| 163 | 158 | key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; |
| 164 | - | |
| 165 | - if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) || | |
| 166 | - (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV))) | |
| 167 | - key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++; | |
| 168 | 159 | } |
| 169 | 160 | |
| 170 | 161 | void ieee80211_key_removed(struct ieee80211_key_conf *key_conf) |
| 171 | 162 | |
| ... | ... | @@ -403,10 +394,8 @@ |
| 403 | 394 | ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm); |
| 404 | 395 | if (key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC) |
| 405 | 396 | ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm); |
| 406 | - if (key->local) { | |
| 397 | + if (key->local) | |
| 407 | 398 | ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key); |
| 408 | - key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--; | |
| 409 | - } | |
| 410 | 399 | |
| 411 | 400 | kfree(key); |
| 412 | 401 | } |
| ... | ... | @@ -468,8 +457,6 @@ |
| 468 | 457 | |
| 469 | 458 | ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key); |
| 470 | 459 | |
| 471 | - key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++; | |
| 472 | - | |
| 473 | 460 | ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key); |
| 474 | 461 | |
| 475 | 462 | mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| 476 | 463 | |
| ... | ... | @@ -511,12 +498,8 @@ |
| 511 | 498 | |
| 512 | 499 | mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| 513 | 500 | |
| 514 | - sdata->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0; | |
| 515 | - | |
| 516 | - list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) { | |
| 517 | - sdata->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++; | |
| 501 | + list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) | |
| 518 | 502 | ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key); |
| 519 | - } | |
| 520 | 503 | |
| 521 | 504 | mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| 522 | 505 | } |
net/mac80211/tx.c
| ... | ... | @@ -1480,7 +1480,12 @@ |
| 1480 | 1480 | { |
| 1481 | 1481 | int tail_need = 0; |
| 1482 | 1482 | |
| 1483 | - if (may_encrypt && local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt) { | |
| 1483 | + /* | |
| 1484 | + * This could be optimised, devices that do full hardware | |
| 1485 | + * crypto (including TKIP MMIC) need no tailroom... But we | |
| 1486 | + * have no drivers for such devices currently. | |
| 1487 | + */ | |
| 1488 | + if (may_encrypt) { | |
| 1484 | 1489 | tail_need = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM; |
| 1485 | 1490 | tail_need -= skb_tailroom(skb); |
| 1486 | 1491 | tail_need = max_t(int, tail_need, 0); |