Commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb

Authored by Dan Rosenberg
Committed by Takashi Iwai
1 parent 7693457547

sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes

The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by
unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to
a buffer overflow.  Because the provided "name" argument isn't
guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible
to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array.
Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via
subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege
escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels().  In
addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

Showing 1 changed file with 2 additions and 2 deletions Side-by-side Diff

sound/oss/soundcard.c
... ... @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
87 87 int i, n;
88 88  
89 89 for (i = 0; i < num_mixer_volumes; i++) {
90   - if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) {
  90 + if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) {
91 91 if (present)
92 92 mixer_vols[i].num = i;
93 93 return mixer_vols[i].levels;
... ... @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
99 99 }
100 100 n = num_mixer_volumes++;
101 101  
102   - strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name);
  102 + strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32);
103 103  
104 104 if (present)
105 105 mixer_vols[n].num = n;