Commit e68b75a027bb94066576139ee33676264f867b87

Authored by Eric Paris
Committed by James Morris
1 parent 3fc689e96c

When the capset syscall is used it is not possible for audit to record the

actual capbilities being added/removed.  This patch adds a new record type
which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets.

example output if you audit capset syscalls would be:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): arch=c000003e syscall=126 success=yes exit=0 a0=17f2014 a1=17f201c a2=80000000 a3=7fff2ab7f060 items=0 ppid=2160 pid=2223 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="setcap" exe="/usr/sbin/setcap" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1322] msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): pid=0 cap_pi=ffffffffffffffff cap_pp=ffffffffffffffff cap_pe=ffffffffffffffff

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Showing 3 changed files with 63 additions and 0 deletions Side-by-side Diff

include/linux/audit.h
... ... @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
100 100 #define AUDIT_TTY 1319 /* Input on an administrative TTY */
101 101 #define AUDIT_EOE 1320 /* End of multi-record event */
102 102 #define AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS 1321 /* Information about fcaps increasing perms */
  103 +#define AUDIT_CAPSET 1322 /* Record showing argument to sys_capset */
103 104  
104 105 #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
105 106 #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
... ... @@ -454,6 +455,7 @@
454 455 extern int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification);
455 456 extern int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat);
456 457 extern void __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_cap_t *pE);
  458 +extern int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *eff, kernel_cap_t *inh, kernel_cap_t *perm);
457 459  
458 460 static inline int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
459 461 {
... ... @@ -526,6 +528,13 @@
526 528 __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, pP, pE);
527 529 }
528 530  
  531 +static inline int audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *eff, kernel_cap_t *inh, kernel_cap_t *perm)
  532 +{
  533 + if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
  534 + return __audit_log_capset(pid, eff, inh, perm);
  535 + return 0;
  536 +}
  537 +
529 538 extern int audit_n_rules;
530 539 extern int audit_signals;
531 540 #else
... ... @@ -558,6 +567,7 @@
558 567 #define audit_mq_notify(d,n) ({ 0; })
559 568 #define audit_mq_getsetattr(d,s) ({ 0; })
560 569 #define audit_log_bprm_fcaps(b, p, e) do { ; } while (0)
  570 +#define audit_log_capset(pid, e, i, p) ({ 0; })
561 571 #define audit_ptrace(t) ((void)0)
562 572 #define audit_n_rules 0
563 573 #define audit_signals 0
... ... @@ -204,6 +204,12 @@
204 204 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
205 205 };
206 206  
  207 +struct audit_aux_data_capset {
  208 + struct audit_aux_data d;
  209 + pid_t pid;
  210 + struct audit_cap_data cap;
  211 +};
  212 +
207 213 struct audit_tree_refs {
208 214 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
209 215 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
... ... @@ -1397,6 +1403,14 @@
1397 1403 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1398 1404 break; }
1399 1405  
  1406 + case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
  1407 + struct audit_aux_data_capset *axs = (void *)aux;
  1408 + audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", axs->pid);
  1409 + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &axs->cap.inheritable);
  1410 + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &axs->cap.permitted);
  1411 + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &axs->cap.effective);
  1412 + break; }
  1413 +
1400 1414 }
1401 1415 audit_log_end(ab);
1402 1416 }
... ... @@ -2567,6 +2581,40 @@
2567 2581 ax->new_pcap.permitted = current->cap_permitted;
2568 2582 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = current->cap_inheritable;
2569 2583 ax->new_pcap.effective = current->cap_effective;
  2584 +}
  2585 +
  2586 +/**
  2587 + * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
  2588 + * @pid target pid of the capset call
  2589 + * @eff effective cap set
  2590 + * @inh inheritible cap set
  2591 + * @perm permited cap set
  2592 + *
  2593 + * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
  2594 + * audit system if applicable
  2595 + */
  2596 +int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *eff, kernel_cap_t *inh, kernel_cap_t *perm)
  2597 +{
  2598 + struct audit_aux_data_capset *ax;
  2599 + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
  2600 +
  2601 + if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
  2602 + return 0;
  2603 +
  2604 + ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
  2605 + if (!ax)
  2606 + return -ENOMEM;
  2607 +
  2608 + ax->d.type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
  2609 + ax->d.next = context->aux;
  2610 + context->aux = (void *)ax;
  2611 +
  2612 + ax->pid = pid;
  2613 + ax->cap.effective = *eff;
  2614 + ax->cap.inheritable = *eff;
  2615 + ax->cap.permitted = *perm;
  2616 +
  2617 + return 0;
2570 2618 }
2571 2619  
2572 2620 /**
... ... @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
7 7 * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
8 8 */
9 9  
  10 +#include <linux/audit.h>
10 11 #include <linux/capability.h>
11 12 #include <linux/mm.h>
12 13 #include <linux/module.h>
... ... @@ -467,6 +468,10 @@
467 468 inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
468 469 i++;
469 470 }
  471 +
  472 + ret = audit_log_capset(pid, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
  473 + if (ret)
  474 + return ret;
470 475  
471 476 if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current)))
472 477 ret = do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid, &effective, &inheritable,