06 Jan, 2009

1 commit


03 Jan, 2009

1 commit

  • Impact: add debug check

    Following up on my previous key reference accounting patches, this patch
    will catch puts on keys that haven't been "got". This won't catch nested
    get/put mismatches though.

    Build and boot tested, with minimal desktop activity and a run of the
    open_posix_testsuite in LTP for testing. No warnings logged.

    Signed-off-by: Darren Hart
    Cc:
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    Darren Hart
     

31 Dec, 2008

1 commit

  • * 'core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (63 commits)
    stacktrace: provide save_stack_trace_tsk() weak alias
    rcu: provide RCU options on non-preempt architectures too
    printk: fix discarding message when recursion_bug
    futex: clean up futex_(un)lock_pi fault handling
    "Tree RCU": scalable classic RCU implementation
    futex: rename field in futex_q to clarify single waiter semantics
    x86/swiotlb: add default swiotlb_arch_range_needs_mapping
    x86/swiotlb: add default physbus conversion
    x86: unify pci iommu setup and allow swiotlb to compile for 32 bit
    x86: add swiotlb allocation functions
    swiotlb: consolidate swiotlb info message printing
    swiotlb: support bouncing of HighMem pages
    swiotlb: factor out copy to/from device
    swiotlb: add arch hook to force mapping
    swiotlb: allow architectures to override physbusphys conversions
    swiotlb: add comment where we handle the overflow of a dma mask on 32 bit
    rcu: fix rcutorture behavior during reboot
    resources: skip sanity check of busy resources
    swiotlb: move some definitions to header
    swiotlb: allow architectures to override swiotlb pool allocation
    ...

    Fix up trivial conflicts in
    arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
    arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
    include/linux/hardirq.h
    as per Ingo's suggestions.

    Linus Torvalds
     

30 Dec, 2008

1 commit

  • Impact: cleanup

    This patch makes the calls to futex_get_key_refs() and futex_drop_key_refs()
    explicitly symmetric by only "putting" keys we successfully "got". Also
    cleanup a couple return points that didn't "put" after a successful "get".

    Build and boot tested on an x86_64 system.

    Signed-off-by: Darren Hart
    Cc:
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    Darren Hart
     

19 Dec, 2008

1 commit

  • Impact: cleanup

    Some apparently left over cruft code was complicating the fault logic:

    Testing if uval != -EFAULT doesn't have any meaning, get_user() sets ret
    to either 0 or -EFAULT, there's no need to compare uval, especially not
    against EFAULT which it will never be. This patch removes the superfluous
    test and clarifies the comment blocks.

    Build and boot tested on an 8way x86_64 system.

    Signed-off-by: Darren Hart
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    Darren Hart
     

18 Dec, 2008

1 commit

  • Impact: simplify code

    I've tripped over the naming of this field a couple times.

    The futex_q uses a "waiters" list to represent a single blocked task and
    then calles wake_up_all().

    This can lead to confusion in trying to understand the intent of the code,
    which is to have a single futex_q for every task waiting on a futex.

    This patch corrects the problem, using a single pointer to the waiting
    task, and an appropriate call to wake_up, rather than wake_up_all.

    Compile and boot tested on an 8way x86_64 machine.

    Signed-off-by: Darren Hart
    Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    Darren Hart
     

25 Nov, 2008

2 commits


14 Nov, 2008

3 commits

  • Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
    This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
    replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
    seeing deallocated memory.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: James Morris
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     
  • Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
    security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
    pointing to it.

    Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
    entry.S via asm-offsets.

    With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: James Morris
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     
  • Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
    the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

    Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

    Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
    sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
    addressed by later patches.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Reviewed-by: James Morris
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Cc: Al Viro
    Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
    Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
    Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     

30 Sep, 2008

5 commits


11 Sep, 2008

1 commit


06 Sep, 2008

1 commit


23 Jun, 2008

1 commit

  • This patch addresses a very sporadic pi-futex related failure in
    highly threaded java apps on large SMP systems.

    David Holmes reported that the pi_state consistency check in
    lookup_pi_state triggered with his test application. This means that
    the kernel internal pi_state and the user space futex variable are out
    of sync. First we assumed that this is a user space data corruption,
    but deeper investigation revieled that the problem happend because the
    pi-futex code is not handling a fault in the futex_lock_pi path when
    the user space variable needs to be fixed up.

    The fault happens when a fork mapped the anon memory which contains
    the futex readonly for COW or the page got swapped out exactly between
    the unlock of the futex and the return of either the new futex owner
    or the task which was the expected owner but failed to acquire the
    kernel internal rtmutex. The current futex_lock_pi() code drops out
    with an inconsistent in case it faults and returns -EFAULT to user
    space. User space has no way to fixup that state.

    When we wrote this code we thought that we could not drop the hash
    bucket lock at this point to handle the fault.

    After analysing the code again it turned out to be wrong because there
    are only two tasks involved which might modify the pi_state and the
    user space variable:

    - the task which acquired the rtmutex
    - the pending owner of the pi_state which did not get the rtmutex

    Both tasks drop into the fixup_pi_state() function before returning to
    user space. The first task which acquired the hash bucket lock faults
    in the fixup of the user space variable, drops the spinlock and calls
    futex_handle_fault() to fault in the page. Now the second task could
    acquire the hash bucket lock and tries to fixup the user space
    variable as well. It either faults as well or it succeeds because the
    first task already faulted the page in.

    One caveat is to avoid a double fixup. After returning from the fault
    handling we reacquire the hash bucket lock and check whether the
    pi_state owner has been modified already.

    Reported-by: David Holmes
    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Cc: Andrew Morton
    Cc: David Holmes
    Cc: Peter Zijlstra
    Cc: Linus Torvalds
    Cc: Peter Zijlstra
    Cc:
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    kernel/futex.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
    1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

    Thomas Gleixner
     

05 May, 2008

1 commit

  • Since FUTEX_FD was scheduled for removal in June 2007 lets remove it.

    Google Code search found no users for it and NGPT was abandoned in 2003
    according to IBM. futex.h is left untouched to make sure the id does
    not get reassigned. Since queue_me() has no users left it is commented
    out to avoid a warning, i didnt remove it completely since it is part of
    the internal api (matching unqueue_me())

    Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn
    Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell (removed rest)
    Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Eric Sesterhenn
     

30 Apr, 2008

1 commit

  • hrtimers have now dynamic users in the network code. Put them under
    debugobjects surveillance as well.

    Add calls to the generic object debugging infrastructure and provide fixup
    functions which allow to keep the system alive when recoverable problems have
    been detected by the object debugging core code.

    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Cc: Greg KH
    Cc: Randy Dunlap
    Cc: Kay Sievers
    Cc: Ingo Molnar
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Thomas Gleixner
     

31 Mar, 2008

1 commit


27 Mar, 2008

1 commit


24 Feb, 2008

2 commits

  • Not all architectures implement futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(). The default
    implementation returns -ENOSYS, which is currently not handled inside of the
    futex guts.

    Futex PI calls and robust list exits with a held futex result in an endless
    loop in the futex code on architectures which have no support.

    Fixing up every place where futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() is called would
    add a fair amount of extra if/else constructs to the already complex code. It
    is also not possible to disable the robust feature before user space tries to
    register robust lists.

    Compile time disabling is not a good idea either, as there are already
    architectures with runtime detection of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic support.

    Detect the functionality at runtime instead by calling
    cmpxchg_futex_value_locked() with a NULL pointer from the futex initialization
    code. This is guaranteed to fail, but the call of
    futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() happens with pagefaults disabled.

    On architectures, which use the asm-generic implementation or have a runtime
    CPU feature detection, a -ENOSYS return value disables the PI/robust features.

    On architectures with a working implementation the call returns -EFAULT and
    the PI/robust features are enabled.

    The relevant syscalls return -ENOSYS and the robust list exit code is blocked,
    when the detection fails.

    Fixes http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/11/149
    Originally reported by: Lennart Buytenhek

    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Acked-by: Ingo Molnar
    Cc: Lennert Buytenhek
    Cc: Riku Voipio
    Cc:
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Thomas Gleixner
     
  • When the futex init code fails to initialize the futex pseudo file system it
    returns early without initializing the hash queues. Should the boot succeed
    then a futex syscall which tries to enqueue a waiter on the hashqueue will
    crash due to the unitilialized plist heads.

    Initialize the hash queues before the filesystem.

    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Acked-by: Ingo Molnar
    Cc: Lennert Buytenhek
    Cc: Riku Voipio
    Cc:
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Thomas Gleixner
     

15 Feb, 2008

1 commit

  • Various user space callers ask for relative timeouts. While we fixed
    that overflow issue in hrtimer_start(), the sites which convert
    relative user space values to absolute timeouts themself were uncovered.

    Instead of putting overflow checks into each place add a function
    which does the sanity checking and convert all affected callers to use
    it.

    Thanks to Frans Pop, who reported the problem and tested the fixes.

    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Acked-by: Ingo Molnar
    Tested-by: Frans Pop

    Thomas Gleixner
     

02 Feb, 2008

3 commits

  • To allow the implementation of optimized rw-locks in user space, glibc
    needs a possibility to select waiters for wakeup depending on a bitset
    mask.

    This requires two new futex OPs: FUTEX_WAIT_BITS and FUTEX_WAKE_BITS
    These OPs are basically the same as FUTEX_WAIT and FUTEX_WAKE plus an
    additional argument - a bitset. Further the FUTEX_WAIT_BITS OP is
    expecting an absolute timeout value instead of the relative one, which
    is used for the FUTEX_WAIT OP.

    FUTEX_WAIT_BITS calls into the kernel with a bitset. The bitset is
    stored in the futex_q structure, which is used to enqueue the waiter
    into the hashed futex waitqueue.

    FUTEX_WAKE_BITS also calls into the kernel with a bitset. The wakeup
    function logically ANDs the bitset with the bitset stored in each
    waiters futex_q structure. If the result is zero (i.e. none of the set
    bits in the bitsets is matching), then the waiter is not woken up. If
    the result is not zero (i.e. one of the set bits in the bitsets is
    matching), then the waiter is woken.

    The bitset provided by the caller must be non zero. In case the
    provided bitset is zero the kernel returns EINVAL.

    Internaly the new OPs are only extensions to the existing FUTEX_WAIT
    and FUTEX_WAKE functions. The existing OPs hand a bitset with all bits
    set into the futex_wait() and futex_wake() functions.

    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    Thomas Gleixner
     
  • The WARN_ON() in the fixup return path of futex_lock_pi() can
    trigger with false positives.

    The following scenario happens:
    t1 holds the futex and t2 and t3 are blocked on the kernel side rt_mutex.
    t1 releases the futex (and the rt_mutex) and assigned t2 to be the next
    owner of the futex.

    t2 is interrupted and returns w/o acquiring the rt_mutex, before t1 can
    release the rtmutex.

    t1 releases the rtmutex and t3 becomes the pending owner of the rtmutex.

    t2 notices that it is the designated owner (user space variable) and
    fails to acquire the rt_mutex via trylock, because it is not allowed to
    steal the rt_mutex from t3. Now it looks at the rt_mutex pending owner (t3)
    and assigns the futex and the pi_state to it.

    During the fixup t4 steals the rtmutex from t3.

    t2 returns from the fixup and the owner of the rt_mutex has changed from
    t3 to t4.

    There is no need to do another round of fixups from t2. The important
    part (t2 is not returning as the user space visible owner) is
    done. The further fixups are done, before either t3 or t4 return to
    user space.

    For the user space it is not relevant which task (t3 or t4) is the real
    owner, as long as those are both in the kernel, which is guaranteed by
    the serialization of the hash bucket lock. Both tasks (which ever returns
    first to userspace - t4 because it locked the rt_mutex or t3 due to a signal)
    are going through the lock_futex_pi() return path where the ownership is
    fixed before the return to user space.

    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    Thomas Gleixner
     
  • this patch:

    commit 37bb6cb4097e29ffee970065b74499cbf10603a3
    Author: Peter Zijlstra
    Date: Fri Jan 25 21:08:32 2008 +0100

    hrtimer: unlock hrtimer_wakeup

    Broke hrtimer_init_sleeper() users. It forgot to fix up the futex
    caller of this function to detect the failed queueing and messed up
    the do_nanosleep() caller in that it could leak a TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
    state.

    Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    Peter Zijlstra
     

09 Jan, 2008

1 commit

  • Roland Westrelin did a great analysis of a long standing thinko in the
    return path of futex_lock_pi.

    While we fixed the lock steal case long ago, which was easy to trigger,
    we never had a test case which exposed this problem and stupidly never
    thought about the reverse lock stealing scenario and the return to user
    space with a stale state.

    When a blocked tasks returns from rt_mutex_timed_locked without holding
    the rt_mutex (due to a signal or timeout) and at the same time the task
    holding the futex is releasing the futex and assigning the ownership of
    the futex to the returning task, then it might happen that a third task
    acquires the rt_mutex before the final rt_mutex_trylock() of the
    returning task happens under the futex hash bucket lock. The returning
    task returns to user space with ETIMEOUT or EINTR, but the user space
    futex value is assigned to this task. The task which acquired the
    rt_mutex fixes the user space futex value right after the hash bucket
    lock has been released by the returning task, but for a short period of
    time the user space value is wrong.

    Detailed description is available at:

    https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=400541

    The fix for this is the same as we do when the rt_mutex was acquired by
    a higher priority task via lock stealing from the designated new owner.
    In that case we already fix the user space value and the internal
    pi_state up before we return. This mechanism can be used to fixup the
    above corner case as well. When the returning task, which failed to
    acquire the rt_mutex, notices that it is the designated owner of the
    futex, then it fixes up the stale user space value and the pi_state,
    before returning to user space. This happens with the futex hash bucket
    lock held, so the task which acquired the rt_mutex is guaranteed to be
    blocked on the hash bucket lock. We can access the rt_mutex owner, which
    gives us the pid of the new owner, safely here as the owner is not able
    to modify (release) it while waiting on the hash bucket lock.

    Rename the "curr" argument of fixup_pi_state_owner() to "newowner" to
    avoid confusion with current and add the check for the stale state into
    the failure path of rt_mutex_trylock() in the return path of
    unlock_futex_pi(). If the situation is detected use
    fixup_pi_state_owner() to assign everything to the owner of the
    rt_mutex.

    Pointed-out-and-tested-by: Roland Westrelin
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Thomas Gleixner
     

05 Dec, 2007

2 commits

  • return -EFAULT not -EINVAL. Found by review.

    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

    Thomas Gleixner
     
  • David Holmes found a bug in the -rt tree with respect to
    pthread_cond_timedwait. After trying his test program on the latest git
    from mainline, I found the bug was there too. The bug he was seeing
    that his test program showed, was that if one were to do a "Ctrl-Z" on a
    process that was in the pthread_cond_timedwait, and then did a "bg" on
    that process, it would return with a "-ETIMEDOUT" but early. That is,
    the timer would go off early.

    Looking into this, I found the source of the problem. And it is a rather
    nasty bug at that.

    Here's the relevant code from kernel/futex.c: (not in order in the file)

    [...]
    smlinkage long sys_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val,
    struct timespec __user *utime, u32 __user *uaddr2,
    u32 val3)
    {
    struct timespec ts;
    ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
    u32 val2 = 0;
    int cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;

    if (utime && (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT || cmd == FUTEX_LOCK_PI)) {
    if (copy_from_user(&ts, utime, sizeof(ts)) != 0)
    return -EFAULT;
    if (!timespec_valid(&ts))
    return -EINVAL;

    t = timespec_to_ktime(ts);
    if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT)
    t = ktime_add(ktime_get(), t);
    tp = &t;
    }
    [...]
    return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, val2, val3);
    }

    [...]

    long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
    u32 __user *uaddr2, u32 val2, u32 val3)
    {
    int ret;
    int cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
    struct rw_semaphore *fshared = NULL;

    if (!(op & FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG))
    fshared = ¤t->mm->mmap_sem;

    switch (cmd) {
    case FUTEX_WAIT:
    ret = futex_wait(uaddr, fshared, val, timeout);

    [...]

    static int futex_wait(u32 __user *uaddr, struct rw_semaphore *fshared,
    u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time)
    {
    [...]
    struct restart_block *restart;
    restart = ¤t_thread_info()->restart_block;
    restart->fn = futex_wait_restart;
    restart->arg0 = (unsigned long)uaddr;
    restart->arg1 = (unsigned long)val;
    restart->arg2 = (unsigned long)abs_time;
    restart->arg3 = 0;
    if (fshared)
    restart->arg3 |= ARG3_SHARED;
    return -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK;
    [...]

    static long futex_wait_restart(struct restart_block *restart)
    {
    u32 __user *uaddr = (u32 __user *)restart->arg0;
    u32 val = (u32)restart->arg1;
    ktime_t *abs_time = (ktime_t *)restart->arg2;
    struct rw_semaphore *fshared = NULL;

    restart->fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
    if (restart->arg3 & ARG3_SHARED)
    fshared = ¤t->mm->mmap_sem;
    return (long)futex_wait(uaddr, fshared, val, abs_time);
    }

    So when the futex_wait is interrupt by a signal we break out of the
    hrtimer code and set up or return from signal. This code does not return
    back to userspace, so we set up a RESTARTBLOCK. The bug here is that we
    save the "abs_time" which is a pointer to the stack variable "ktime_t t"
    from sys_futex.

    This returns and unwinds the stack before we get to call our signal. On
    return from the signal we go to futex_wait_restart, where we update all
    the parameters for futex_wait and call it. But here we have a problem
    where abs_time is no longer valid.

    I verified this with print statements, and sure enough, what abs_time
    was set to ends up being garbage when we get to futex_wait_restart.

    The solution I did to solve this (with input from Linus Torvalds)
    was to add unions to the restart_block to allow system calls to
    use the restart with specific parameters. This way the futex code now
    saves the time in a 64bit value in the restart block instead of storing
    it on the stack.

    Note: I'm a bit nervious to add "linux/types.h" and use u32 and u64
    in thread_info.h, when there's a #ifdef __KERNEL__ just below that.
    Not sure what that is there for. If this turns out to be a problem, I've
    tested this with using "unsigned int" for u32 and "unsigned long long" for
    u64 and it worked just the same. I'm using u32 and u64 just to be
    consistent with what the futex code uses.

    Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Acked-by: Linus Torvalds

    Steven Rostedt
     

05 Nov, 2007

1 commit


20 Oct, 2007

2 commits

  • The find_task_by_something is a set of macros are used to find task by pid
    depending on what kind of pid is proposed - global or virtual one. All of
    them are wrappers above the most generic one - find_task_by_pid_type_ns() -
    and just substitute some args for it.

    It turned out, that dereferencing the current->nsproxy->pid_ns construction
    and pushing one more argument on the stack inline cause kernel text size to
    grow.

    This patch moves all this stuff out-of-line into kernel/pid.c. Together
    with the next patch it saves a bit less than 400 bytes from the .text
    section.

    Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
    Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu
    Cc: Oleg Nesterov
    Cc: Paul Menage
    Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
    Acked-by: Ingo Molnar
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Pavel Emelyanov
     
  • This is the largest patch in the set. Make all (I hope) the places where
    the pid is shown to or get from user operate on the virtual pids.

    The idea is:
    - all in-kernel data structures must store either struct pid itself
    or the pid's global nr, obtained with pid_nr() call;
    - when seeking the task from kernel code with the stored id one
    should use find_task_by_pid() call that works with global pids;
    - when showing pid's numerical value to the user the virtual one
    should be used, but however when one shows task's pid outside this
    task's namespace the global one is to be used;
    - when getting the pid from userspace one need to consider this as
    the virtual one and use appropriate task/pid-searching functions.

    [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
    [akpm@linux-foundation.org: nuther build fix]
    [akpm@linux-foundation.org: yet nuther build fix]
    [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded casts]
    Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
    Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
    Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu
    Cc: Oleg Nesterov
    Cc: Paul Menage
    Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Pavel Emelyanov
     

19 Oct, 2007

1 commit

  • Get rid of sparse related warnings from places that use integer as NULL
    pointer.

    [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
    Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger
    Cc: Andi Kleen
    Cc: Jeff Garzik
    Cc: Matt Mackall
    Cc: Ian Kent
    Cc: Arnd Bergmann
    Cc: Davide Libenzi
    Cc: Stephen Smalley
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Stephen Hemminger
     

17 Oct, 2007

1 commit


01 Oct, 2007

1 commit

  • Calling handle_futex_death in exit_robust_list for the different robust
    mutexes of a thread basically frees the mutex. Another thread might grab
    the lock immediately which updates the next pointer of the mutex.
    fetch_robust_entry over the next pointer might therefore branch into the
    robust mutex list of a different thread. This can cause two problems: 1)
    some mutexes held by the dead thread are not getting freed and 2) some
    mutexs held by a different thread are freed.

    The next point need to be read before calling handle_futex_death.

    Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky
    Acked-by: Ingo Molnar
    Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Martin Schwidefsky
     

23 Aug, 2007

1 commit


01 Aug, 2007

1 commit

  • The fourth argument of sys_futex is ignored when op == FUTEX_WAKE_OP,
    but futex_wake_op expects it as its nr_wake2 parameter.

    The only user of this operation in glibc is always passing 1, so this
    bug had no consequences so far.

    Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab
    Cc: Ingo Molnar
    Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper
    Cc:
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Andreas Schwab