06 Jan, 2009
1 commit
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We used to have rather schizophrenic set of checks for NULL ->i_op even
though it had been eliminated years ago. You'd need to go out of your
way to set it to NULL explicitly _and_ a bunch of code would die on
such inodes anyway. After killing two remaining places that still
did that bogosity, all that crap can go away.Signed-off-by: Al Viro
01 Jan, 2009
1 commit
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Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying
operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
14 Nov, 2008
4 commits
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Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.
This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:
(1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.
(2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
21 Oct, 2008
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro
14 Oct, 2008
1 commit
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We now have the infrastructure to sort this out but rather than teaching
the syscall tty lock rules we move the hard work into a tty helperSigned-off-by: Alan Cox
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
01 Aug, 2008
1 commit
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New primitive: alloc_fd(start, flags). get_unused_fd() and
get_unused_fd_flags() become wrappers on top of it.Signed-off-by: Al Viro
27 Jul, 2008
9 commits
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* dup2() should return -EBADF on exceeded sysctl_nr_open
* dup() should *not* return -EINVAL even if you have rlimit set to 0;
it should get -EMFILE instead.Check for orig_start exceeding rlimit taken to sys_fcntl().
Failing expand_files() in dup{2,3}() now gets -EMFILE remapped to -EBADF.
Consequently, remaining checks for rlimit are taken to expand_files().Signed-off-by: Al Viro
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* do not pass nameidata; struct path is all the callers want.
* switch to new helpers:
user_path_at(dfd, pathname, flags, &path)
user_path(pathname, &path)
user_lpath(pathname, &path)
user_path_dir(pathname, &path) (fail if not a directory)
The last 3 are trivial macro wrappers for the first one.
* remove nameidata in callers.Signed-off-by: Al Viro
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Almost all users __user_walk_fd() and friends care only about struct path.
Get rid of the few that do not.Signed-off-by: Al Viro
-
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
-
Move the immutable and append-only checks from chmod, chown and utimes
into notify_change(). Checks for immutable and append-only files are
always performed by the VFS and not by the filesystem (see
permission() and may_...() in namei.c), so these belong in
notify_change(), and not in inode_change_ok().This should be completely equivalent.
CC: Ulrich Drepper
CC: Michael Kerrisk
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
* MAY_CHDIR is redundant - it's an equivalent of MAY_ACCESS
* MAY_ACCESS on fuse should affect only the last step of pathname resolution
* fchdir() and chroot() should pass MAY_ACCESS, for the same reason why
chdir() needs that.
* now that we pass MAY_ACCESS explicitly in all cases, LOOKUP_ACCESS can be
removed; it has no business being in nameidata.Signed-off-by: Al Viro
-
long overdue...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
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... so we ought to pass MAY_CHDIR to vfs_permission() instead of having
it triggered on every step of preceding pathname resolution. LOOKUP_CHDIR
is killed by that.Signed-off-by: Al Viro
-
vfs_permission(MAY_WRITE) already checked for the inode being
immutable, so no need to repeat it.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig
25 Jul, 2008
1 commit
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Adds a check for an overflow in the filesystem size so if someone is
checking with statfs() on a 16G blocksize hugetlbfs in a 32bit binary that
it will report back EOVERFLOW instead of a size of 0.Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan
Signed-off-by: Jon Tollefson
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
05 Jul, 2008
1 commit
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This commit includes a bugfix for the fragile setuid fixup code in the
case that filesystem capabilities are supported (in access()). The effect
of this fix is gated on filesystem capability support because changing
securebits is only supported when filesystem capabilities support is
configured.)[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
02 May, 2008
1 commit
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Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
28 Apr, 2008
1 commit
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Convert XIP to support non-struct page backed memory, using VM_MIXEDMAP for
the user mappings.This requires the get_xip_page API to be changed to an address based one.
Improve the API layering a little bit too, while we're here.This is required in order to support XIP filesystems on memory that isn't
backed with struct page (but memory with struct page is still supported too).Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin
Acked-by: Carsten Otte
Cc: Jared Hulbert
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky
Cc: Heiko Carstens
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
19 Apr, 2008
7 commits
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There have been a few oopses caused by 'struct file's with NULL f_vfsmnts.
There was also a set of potentially missed mnt_want_write()s from
dentry_open() calls.This patch provides a very simple debugging framework to catch these kinds of
bugs. It will WARN_ON() them, but should stop us from having any oopses or
mnt_writer count imbalances.I'm quite convinced that this is a good thing because it found bugs in the
stuff I was working on as soon as I wrote it.[hch: made it conditional on a debug option.
But it's still a little bit too ugly][hch: merged forced remount r/o fix from Dave and akpm's fix for the fix]
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
It is OK to let access() go without using a mnt_want/drop_write() pair because
it doesn't actually do writes to the filesystem, and it is inherently racy
anyway. This is a rare case when it is OK to use __mnt_is_readonly()
directly.Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
chown/chmod,etc... don't call permission in the same way that the normal
"open for write" calls do. They still write to the filesystem, so bump the
write count during these operations.Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
This is the first really tricky patch in the series. It elevates the writer
count on a mount each time a non-special file is opened for write.We used to do this in may_open(), but Miklos pointed out that __dentry_open()
is used as well to create filps. This will cover even those cases, while a
call in may_open() would not have.There is also an elevated count around the vfs_create() call in open_namei().
See the comments for more details, but we need this to fix a 'create, remount,
fail r/w open()' race.Some filesystems forego the use of normal vfs calls to create
struct files. Make sure that these users elevate the mnt
writer count because they will get __fput(), and we need
to make sure they're balanced.Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
open_namei() will, in the future, need to take mount write counts
over its creation and truncation (via may_open()) operations. It
needs to keep these write counts until any potential filp that is
created gets __fput()'d.This gets complicated in the error handling and becomes very murky
as to how far open_namei() actually got, and whether or not that
mount write count was taken. That makes it a bad interface.All that the current do_filp_open() really does is allocate the
nameidata on the stack, then call open_namei().So, this merges those two functions and moves filp_open() over
to namei.c so it can be close to its buddy: do_filp_open(). It
also gets a kerneldoc comment in the process.Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
My end goal here is to make sure all users of may_open()
return filps. This will ensure that we properly release
mount write counts which were taken for the filp in
may_open().This patch moves the sys_open flags to namei flags
calculation into fs/namei.c. We'll shortly be moving
the nameidata_to_filp() calls into namei.c, and this
gets the sys_open flags to a place where we can get
at them when we need them.Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
11 Apr, 2008
1 commit
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The prevent_tail_call() macro works around the problem of the compiler
clobbering argument words on the stack, which for asmlinkage functions
is the caller's (user's) struct pt_regs. The tail/sibling-call
optimization is not the only way that the compiler can decide to use
stack argument words as scratch space, which we have to prevent.
Other optimizations can do it too.Until we have new compiler support to make "asmlinkage" binding on the
compiler's own use of the stack argument frame, we have work around all
the manifestations of this issue that crop up.More cases seem to be prevented by also keeping the incoming argument
variables live at the end of the function. This makes their original
stack slots attractive places to leave those variables, so the compiler
tends not clobber them for something else. It's still no guarantee, but
it handles some observed cases that prevent_tail_call() did not.Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
19 Mar, 2008
1 commit
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Make sure no-one calls dentry_open with a NULL vfsmount argument and crap
out with a stacktrace otherwise. A NULL file->f_vfsmnt has always been
problematic, but with the per-mount r/o tracking we can't accept anymore
at all.[AV] the last place that passed NULL had been eliminated by the previous
patch (reiserfs xattr stuff)Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
15 Feb, 2008
3 commits
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In nearly all cases the set_fs_{root,pwd}() calls work on a struct
path. Change the function to reflect this and use path_get() here.Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
vfsmount of a struct path in the right order* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path)
* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig
Cc:
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: Steven French
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinuxwith patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinuxThis patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
09 Feb, 2008
2 commits
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These exports (which aren't used and which are in fact dangerous to use
because they pretty much form a security hole to use) have been marked
_UNUSED since 2.6.24 with removal in 2.6.25. This patch is their final
departure from the Linux kernel tree.Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Nov, 2007
1 commit
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sys_open / sys_read were used in the early 1.2 days to load firmware from
disk inside drivers. Since 2.0 or so this was deprecated behavior, but
several drivers still were using this. Since a few years we have a
request_firmware() API that implements this in a nice, consistent way.
Only some old ISA sound drivers (pre-ALSA) still straggled along for some
time.... however with commit c2b1239a9f22f19c53543b460b24507d0e21ea0c the
last user is now gone.This is a good thing, since using sys_open / sys_read etc for firmware is a
very buggy to dangerous thing to do; these operations put an fd in the
process file descriptor table.... which then can be tampered with from
other threads for example. For those who don't want the firmware loader,
filp_open()/vfs_read are the better APIs to use, without this security
issue.The patch below marks sys_open and sys_read unused now that they're
really not used anymore, and for deletion in the 2.6.25 timeframe.Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
21 Oct, 2007
1 commit
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makes caller simpler *and* allows to scan ancestors
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
17 Oct, 2007
2 commits
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Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimitAug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Andrew Morgan
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The early LFS work that Linux uses favours EFBIG in various places. SuSv3
specifically uses EOVERFLOW for this as noted by Michael (Bug 7253)[EOVERFLOW]
The named file is a regular file and the size of the file cannot be
represented correctly in an object of type off_t. We should therefore
transition to the proper error return codeSigned-off-by: Alan Cox
Cc: Theodore Tso
Cc: Jens Axboe
Cc: Arjan van de Ven
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
