16 Jul, 2006
1 commit
-
This just turns off chmod() on the /proc// files, since there is no
good reason to allow it, and had we disallowed it originally, the nasty
/proc race exploit wouldn't have been possible.The other patches already fixed the problem chmod() could cause, so this
is really just some final mop-up..This particular version is based off a patch by Eugene and Marcel which
had much better naming than my original equivalent one.Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Jul, 2006
2 commits
-
Clearign all of i_mode was a bit draconian. We only really care about
S_ISUID/ISGID, after all.Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
-
We have a bad interaction with both the kernel and user space being able
to change some of the /proc file status. This fixes the most obvious
part of it, but I expect we'll also make it harder for users to modify
even their "own" files in /proc.Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
01 Jul, 2006
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
27 Jun, 2006
27 commits
-
Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a
context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled
with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a
process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one
envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label
sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of
the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same.I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to
write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label.
I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages
kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission
setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label
of the running process.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Try to make next_tid() a bit more readable and deletes unnecessary
"pid_alive(pos)" check.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
first_tid:
/* If nr exceeds the number of threads there is nothing todo */
if (nr) {
if (nr >= get_nr_threads(leader))
goto done;
}This is not reliable: sub-threads can exit after this check, so the
'for' loop below can overlap and proc_task_readdir() can return an
already filldir'ed dirents.for (; pos && pid_alive(pos); pos = next_thread(pos)) {
if (--nr > 0)
continue;Off-by-one error, will return 'leader' when nr == 1.
This patch tries to fix these problems and simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This is just like my previous removal of tasklist_lock from first_tgid, and
next_tgid. It simply had to wait until it was rcu safe to walk the thread
list.This should be the last instance of the tasklist_lock in proc. So user
processes should not be able to influence the tasklist lock hold times.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
In process of getting proc_fd_access_allowed to work it has developed a few
warts. In particular the special case that always allows introspection and
the special case to allow inspection of kernel threads.The special case for introspection is needed for /proc/self/mem.
The special case for kernel threads really should be overridable
by security modules.So consolidate these checks into ptrace.c:may_attach().
The check to always allow introspection is trivial.
The check to allow access to kernel threads, and zombies is a little
trickier. mem_read and mem_write already verify an mm exists so it isn't
needed twice. proc_fd_access_allowed only doesn't want a check to verify
task->mm exits, s it prevents all access to kernel threads. So just move
the task->mm check into ptrace_attach where it is needed for practical
reasons.I did a quick audit and none of the security modules in the kernel seem to
care if they are passed a task without an mm into security_ptrace. So the
above move should be safe and it allows security modules to come up with
more restrictive policy.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Since 2.2 we have been doing a chroot check to see if it is appropriate to
return a read or follow one of these magic symlinks. The chroot check was
asking a question about the visibility of files to the calling process and
it was actually checking the destination process, and not the files
themselves. That test was clearly bogus.In my first pass through I simply fixed the test to check the visibility of
the files themselves. That naive approach to fixing the permissions was
too strict and resulted in cases where a task could not even see all of
it's file descriptors.What has disturbed me about relaxing this check is that file descriptors
are per-process private things, and they are occasionaly used a user space
capability tokens. Looking a little farther into the symlink path on /proc
I did find userid checks and a check for capability (CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) so
there were permissions checking this.But I was still concerned about privacy. Besides /proc there is only one
other way to find out this kind of information, and that is ptrace. ptrace
has been around for a long time and it has a well established security
model.So after thinking about it I finally realized that the permission checks
that make sense are the permission checks applied to ptrace_attach. The
checks are simple per process, and won't cause nasty surprises for people
coming from less capable unices.Unfortunately there is one case that the current ptrace_attach test does
not cover: Zombies and kernel threads. Single stepping those kinds of
processes is impossible. Being able to see which file descriptors are open
on these tasks is important to lsof, fuser and friends. So for these
special processes I made the rule you can't find out unless you have
CAP_SYS_PTRACE.These proc permission checks should now conform to the principle of least
surprise. As well as using much less code to implement :)Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The code doesn't need to sleep to when making this check so I can just do the
comparison and not worry about the reference counts.TODO: While looking at this I realized that my original cleanup did not push
the permission check far enough down into the stack. The call of
proc_check_dentry_visible needs to move out of the generic proc
readlink/follow link code and into the individual get_link instances.
Otherwise the shared resources checks are not quite correct (shared
files_struct does not require a shared fs_struct), and there are races with
unshare.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Incrementally update my proc-dont-lock-task_structs-indefinitely patches so
that they work with struct pid instead of struct task_ref.Mostly this is a straight 1-1 substitution.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Every inode in /proc holds a reference to a struct task_struct. If a
directory or file is opened and remains open after the the task exits this
pinning continues. With 8K stacks on a 32bit machine the amount pinned per
file descriptor is about 10K.Normally I would figure a reasonable per user process limit is about 100
processes. With 80 processes, with a 1000 file descriptors each I can trigger
the 00M killer on a 32bit kernel, because I have pinned about 800MB of useless
data.This patch replaces the struct task_struct pointer with a pointer to a struct
task_ref which has a struct task_struct pointer. The so the pinning of dead
tasks does not happen.The code now has to contend with the fact that the task may now exit at any
time. Which is a little but not muh more complicated.With this change it takes about 1000 processes each opening up 1000 file
descriptors before I can trigger the OOM killer. Much better.[mlp@google.com: task_mmu small fixes]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Trond Myklebust
Cc: Paul Jackson
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Albert Cahalan
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Meda
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Currently in /proc at several different places we define buffers to hold a
process id, or a file descriptor . In most of them we use either a hard coded
number or a different define. Modify them all to use PROC_NUMBUF, so the code
has a chance of being maintained.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Like the bug Oleg spotted in first_tid there was also a small off by one
error in first_tgid, when a seek was done on the /proc directory. This
fixes that and changes the code structure to make it a little more obvious
what is going on.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Since we no longer need the tasklist_lock for get_task_struct the lookup
methods no longer need the tasklist_lock.This just depends on my previous patch that makes get_task_struct() rcu
safe.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
We don't need the tasklist_lock to safely iterate through processes
anymore.This depends on my previous to task patches that make get_task_struct rcu
safe, and that make next_task() rcu safe. I haven't gotten
first_tid/next_tid yet only because next_thread is missing an
rcu_dereference.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
There are a couple of problems this patch addresses.
- /proc//task currently does not work correctly if you stop reading
in the middle of a directory.- /proc/ currently requires a full pass through the task list with
the tasklist lock held, to determine there are no more processes to read.- The hand rolled integer to string conversion does not properly running
out of buffer space.- We seem to be batching reading of pids from the tasklist without reason,
and complicating the logic of the code.This patch addresses that by changing how tasks are processed. A
first_ function is built that handles restarts, and a
next_ function is built that just advances to the next task.first_ when it detects a restart usually uses find_task_by_pid. If
that doesn't work because there has been a seek on the directory, or we have
already given a complete directory listing, it first checks the number tasks
of that type, and only if we are under that count does it walk through all of
the tasks to find the one we are interested in.The code that fills in the directory is simpler because there is only a single
for loop.The hand rolled integer to string conversion is replaced by snprintf which
should handle the the out of buffer case correctly.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
proc_lookup and task exiting are not synchronized, although some of the
previous code may have suggested that. Every time before we reuse a dentry
namei.c calls d_op->derevalidate which prevents us from reusing a stale dcache
entry. Unfortunately it does not prevent us from returning a stale dcache
entry. This race has been explicitly plugged in proc_pid_lookup but there is
nothing to confine it to just that proc lookup function.So to prevent the race I call revalidate explictily in all of the proc lookup
functions after I call d_add, and report an error if the revalidate does not
succeed.Years ago Al Viro did something similar but those changes got lost in the
churn.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
To keep the dcache from filling up with dead /proc entries we flush them on
process exit. However over the years that code has gotten hairy with a
dentry_pointer and a lock in task_struct and misdocumented as a correctness
feature.I have rewritten this code to look and see if we have a corresponding entry in
the dcache and if so flush it on process exit. This removes the extra fields
in the task_struct and allows me to trivially handle the case of a
/proc//task/ entry as well as the current /proc/ entries.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
All of the functions for proc_maps_operations are already defined in
task_mmu.c so move the operations structure to keep the functionality
together.Since task_nommu.c implements a dummy version of /proc//maps give it a
simplified version of proc_maps_operations that it can modify to best suit its
needs.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Use getattr to get an accurate link count when needed. This is cheaper and
more accurate than trying to derive it by walking the thread list of a
process.Especially as it happens when needed stat instead of at readdir time.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Long ago and far away in 2.2 we started checking to ensure the files we
displayed in /proc were visible to the current process. It was an
unsophisticated time and no one was worried about functions full of FIXMES in
a stable kernel. As time passed the function became sacred and was enshrined
in the shrine of how things have always been. The fixes came in but only to
keep the function working no one really remembering or documenting why we did
things that way.The intent and the functionality make a lot of sense. Don't let /proc be an
access point for files a process can see no other way. The implementation
however is completely wrong.We are currently checking the root directories of the two processes, we are
not checking the actual file descriptors themselves.We are strangely checking with a permission method instead of just when we use
the data.This patch fixes the logic to actually check the file descriptors and make a
note that implementing a permission method for this part of /proc almost
certainly indicates a bug in the reasoning.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The inode operations only exist to support the proc_permission function.
Currently mem_read and mem_write have all the same permission checks as
ptrace. The fs check makes no sense in this context, and we can trivially get
around it by calling ptrace.So simply the code by killing the strange weird case.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
First we can access every /proc//task/ directory as /proc/ so
proc_task_permission is not usefully limiting visibility.Second having related filesystems information should have nothing to do with
process visibility. kill does not implement any checks like that.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The sole renaming use of proc_inode.type is to discover the file descriptor
number, so just store the file descriptor number and don't wory about
processing this field. This removes any /proc limits on the maximum number of
file descriptors, and clears the path to make the hard coded /proc inode
numbers go away.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Currently in /proc if the task is dumpable all of files are owned by the tasks
effective users. Otherwise the files are owned by root. Unless it is the
/proc// or /proc//task/ directory in that case we always make
the directory owned by the effective user.However the special case for directories is pointless except as a way to read
the effective user, because the permissions on both of those directories are
world readable, and executable./proc//status provides a much better way to read a processes effecitve
userid, so it is silly to try to provide that on the directory.So this patch simplifies the code by removing a pointless special case and
gets us one step closer to being able to remove the hard coded /proc inode
numbers.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The removed fields are already set by proc_alloc_inode. Initializing them in
proc_alloc_inode implies they need it for proper cleanup. At least ei->pde
was not set on all paths making it look like proc_alloc_inode was buggy. So
just remove the redundant assignments.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
We already call everything except do_proc_readlink outside of the BKL in
proc_pid_followlink, and there appears to be nothing in do_proc_readlink that
needs any special protection.So remove this leftover from one of the BKL cleanup efforts.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Add a /proc//attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for
newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new
entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission
for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission
for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can
assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook
"security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or
from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook
should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes.Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
20 Jun, 2006
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
20 Apr, 2006
1 commit
-
There are places in the kernel where we look up files in fd tables and
access the file structure without holding refereces to the file. So, we
need special care to avoid the race between looking up files in the fd
table and tearing down of the file in another CPU. Otherwise, one might
see a NULL f_dentry or such torn down version of the file. This patch
fixes those special places where such a race may happen.Signed-off-by: Dipankar Sarma
Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
01 Apr, 2006
1 commit
-
proc_check_chroot() does the check in a very unintuitive way (keeping a
copy of the argument, then modifying the argument), and has uncommented
sideeffects.Signed-off-by: Herbert Poetzl
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
21 Mar, 2006
1 commit
-
Create a new file under /proc/self, called mountstats, where mounted file
systems can export information (configuration options, performance counters,
and so on). Use a mechanism similar to /proc/mounts and s_ops->show_options.This mechanism does not violate namespace security, and is safe to use while
other processes are unmounting file systems.Thanks to Mike Waychison for his review and comments.
Test-plan:
Test concurrent mount/unmount operations while cat'ing /proc/self/mountstats.Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust
12 Jan, 2006
1 commit
-
fs: Use where capable() is used.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap
Acked-by: Tim Schmielau
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
08 Nov, 2005
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Oct, 2005
1 commit
-
"proc_smaps_operations" is not defined in case of "CONFIG_MMU=n".
Signed-off-by: Yoshinori Sato
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
23 Sep, 2005
1 commit
-
fs/proc/base.c: In function `proc_task_root_link':
fs/proc/base.c:364: warning: ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations and codeSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
22 Sep, 2005
1 commit
-
When the main thread of a thread group has done pthread_exit() and died,
the other threads are still happily running, but will not be visible
under /proc because their leader is no longer accessible.This fixes the access control so that we can see the sub-threads again.
Signed-off-by: Sripathi Kodi
Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
