18 Dec, 2014
1 commit
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Pull user namespace related fixes from Eric Biederman:
"As these are bug fixes almost all of thes changes are marked for
backporting to stable.The first change (implicitly adding MNT_NODEV on remount) addresses a
regression that was created when security issues with unprivileged
remount were closed. I go on to update the remount test to make it
easy to detect if this issue reoccurs.Then there are a handful of mount and umount related fixes.
Then half of the changes deal with the a recently discovered design
bug in the permission checks of gid_map. Unix since the beginning has
allowed setting group permissions on files to less than the user and
other permissions (aka ---rwx---rwx). As the unix permission checks
stop as soon as a group matches, and setgroups allows setting groups
that can not later be dropped, results in a situtation where it is
possible to legitimately use a group to assign fewer privileges to a
process. Which means dropping a group can increase a processes
privileges.The fix I have adopted is that gid_map is now no longer writable
without privilege unless the new file /proc/self/setgroups has been
set to permanently disable setgroups.The bulk of user namespace using applications even the applications
using applications using user namespaces without privilege remain
unaffected by this change. Unfortunately this ix breaks a couple user
space applications, that were relying on the problematic behavior (one
of which was tools/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c).To hopefully prevent needing a regression fix on top of my security
fix I rounded folks who work with the container implementations mostly
like to be affected and encouraged them to test the changes.> So far nothing broke on my libvirt-lxc test bed. :-)
> Tested with openSUSE 13.2 and libvirt 1.2.9.
> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger> Tested on Fedora20 with libvirt 1.2.11, works fine.
> Tested-by: Chen Hanxiao> Ok, thanks - yes, unprivileged lxc is working fine with your kernels.
> Just to be sure I was testing the right thing I also tested using
> my unprivileged nsexec testcases, and they failed on setgroup/setgid
> as now expected, and succeeded there without your patches.
> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn> I tested this with Sandstorm. It breaks as is and it works if I add
> the setgroups thing.
> Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski # breaks things as designed :("* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests
userns; Correct the comment in map_write
userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled
userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex
userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings
userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping
userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished
userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings.
groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks
mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_root
mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mnt
mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers.
umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs.
umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force
mnt: Update unprivileged remount test
mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount
12 Dec, 2014
3 commits
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It is important that all maps are less than PAGE_SIZE
or else setting the last byte of the buffer to '0'
could write off the end of the allocated storage.Correct the misleading comment.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
-
Now that setgroups can be disabled and not reenabled, setting gid_map
without privielge can now be enabled when setgroups is disabled.This restores most of the functionality that was lost when unprivileged
setting of gid_map was removed. Applications that use this functionality
will need to check to see if they use setgroups or init_groups, and if they
don't they can be fixed by simply disabling setgroups before writing to
gid_map.Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc//setgroups
A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
future in this user namespace.A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.
- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
their parents.- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
not allow checking the permissions at open time.- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
for the user namespace is set.This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
from a process that already has that ability.A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without
privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
10 Dec, 2014
5 commits
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Generalize id_map_mutex so it can be used for more state of a user namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
If you did not create the user namespace and are allowed
to write to uid_map or gid_map you should already have the necessary
privilege in the parent user namespace to establish any mapping
you want so this will not affect userspace in practice.Limiting unprivileged uid mapping establishment to the creator of the
user namespace makes it easier to verify all credentials obtained with
the uid mapping can be obtained without the uid mapping without
privilege.Limiting unprivileged gid mapping establishment (which is temporarily
absent) to the creator of the user namespace also ensures that the
combination of uid and gid can already be obtained without privilege.This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
setresuid allows the euid to be set to any of uid, euid, suid, and
fsuid. Therefor it is safe to allow an unprivileged user to map
their euid and use CAP_SETUID privileged with exactly that uid,
as no new credentials can be obtained.I can not find a combination of existing system calls that allows setting
uid, euid, suid, and fsuid from the fsuid making the previous use
of fsuid for allowing unprivileged mappings a bug.This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards
compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be
established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications
includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.cMost of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition
of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups is disabled
setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map
with privilege this change will have no affect.This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called,
in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually
be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function
to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call
that function in the setgroups permission check.This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups
without privilege using user namespaces.Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
06 Dec, 2014
1 commit
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The rule is simple. Don't allow anything that wouldn't be allowed
without unprivileged mappings.It was previously overlooked that establishing gid mappings would
allow dropping groups and potentially gaining permission to files and
directories that had lesser permissions for a specific group than for
all other users.This is the rule needed to fix CVE-2014-8989 and prevent any other
security issues with new_idmap_permitted.The reason for this rule is that the unix permission model is old and
there are programs out there somewhere that take advantage of every
little corner of it. So allowing a uid or gid mapping to be
established without privielge that would allow anything that would not
be allowed without that mapping will result in expectations from some
code somewhere being violated. Violated expectations about the
behavior of the OS is a long way to say a security issue.Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
05 Dec, 2014
5 commits
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro
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take struct ns_common *, for now simply wrappers around proc_{alloc,free}_inum()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
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We can do that now. And kill ->inum(), while we are at it - all instances
are identical.Signed-off-by: Al Viro
-
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
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for now - just move corresponding ->proc_inum instances over there
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
09 Aug, 2014
1 commit
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proc_uid_seq_operations, proc_gid_seq_operations and
proc_projid_seq_operations are only called in proc_id_map_open with
seq_open as const struct seq_operations so we can constify the 3
structures and update proc_id_map_open prototype.text data bss dec hex filename
6817 404 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-before
6913 308 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-afterSigned-off-by: Fabian Frederick
Cc: Joe Perches
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
07 Jun, 2014
1 commit
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-uid->gid
-split some function declarations
-if/then/else warningSigned-off-by: Fabian Frederick
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Apr, 2014
1 commit
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smp_read_barrier_depends() can be used if there is data dependency between
the readers - i.e. if the read operation after the barrier uses address
that was obtained from the read operation before the barrier.In this file, there is only control dependency, no data dependecy, so the
use of smp_read_barrier_depends() is incorrect. The code could fail in the
following way:
* the cpu predicts that idx < entries is true and starts executing the
body of the for loop
* the cpu fetches map->extent[0].first and map->extent[0].count
* the cpu fetches map->nr_extents
* the cpu verifies that idx < extents is true, so it commits the
instructions in the body of the for loopThe problem is that in this scenario, the cpu read map->extent[0].first
and map->nr_extents in the wrong order. We need a full read memory barrier
to prevent it.Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
04 Apr, 2014
1 commit
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Code that is obj-y (always built-in) or dependent on a bool Kconfig
(built-in or absent) can never be modular. So using module_init as an
alias for __initcall can be somewhat misleading.Fix these up now, so that we can relocate module_init from init.h into
module.h in the future. If we don't do this, we'd have to add module.h
to obviously non-modular code, and that would be a worse thing.The audit targets the following module_init users for change:
kernel/user.c obj-y
kernel/kexec.c bool KEXEC (one instance per arch)
kernel/profile.c bool PROFILING
kernel/hung_task.c bool DETECT_HUNG_TASK
kernel/sched/stats.c bool SCHEDSTATS
kernel/user_namespace.c bool USER_NSNote that direct use of __initcall is discouraged, vs. one of the
priority categorized subgroups. As __initcall gets mapped onto
device_initcall, our use of subsys_initcall (which makes sense for these
files) will thus change this registration from level 6-device to level
4-subsys (i.e. slightly earlier). However no observable impact of that
difference has been observed during testing.Also, two instances of missing ";" at EOL are fixed in kexec.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Cc: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Eric Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
21 Feb, 2014
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: Brian Campbell
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
24 Sep, 2013
1 commit
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Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos
caches held within the kernel.This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's
processes so that the user's cron jobs can work.The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like:
struct user_namespace
\___ .krb_cache keyring - The register
\___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache
\___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache
\___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache
\___ tkt785 big_key - A ccache blob
\___ tkt12345 big_key - Another ccache blobOr possibly:
struct user_namespace
\___ .krb_cache keyring - The register
\___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache
\___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache
\___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache
\___ tkt785 keyring - A ccache
\___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key
\___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
\___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
\___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
\___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key
\___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_keyWhat goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace. Kernel
support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want.The user asks for their Kerberos cache by:
krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring);
The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some
other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID). This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to
mess with the cache.The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb." that the possessor can read,
search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to. Active LSMs get a
chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link.Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a
timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring
goes away after a while. The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to
three days.Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the
register. The cache keyrings are added to it. This means that standard key
search and garbage collection facilities are available.The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left
in it is then automatically gc'd.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Simo Sorce
cc: Serge E. Hallyn
cc: Eric W. Biederman
08 Sep, 2013
1 commit
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Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug
fixes.The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable
is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be
considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally
tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace
infrastructure.Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace
capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows
the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace"* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy
capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged
pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD
userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.
namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on.
pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup
sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs
userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted
vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc//ns/mnt between namespaces
kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code.
proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem
vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
27 Aug, 2013
1 commit
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Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already
mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace.Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant
way. I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem
has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories
/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly
for other filesystems to mount on top of.Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that
function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs. This makes this
test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when
the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user
namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves.Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
09 Aug, 2013
1 commit
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Ensure that user_namespace->parent chain can't grow too much.
Currently we use the hardroded 32 as limit.Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
07 Aug, 2013
1 commit
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unshare_userns(new_cred) does *new_cred = prepare_creds() before
create_user_ns() which can fail. However, the caller expects that
it doesn't need to take care of new_cred if unshare_userns() fails.We could change the single caller, sys_unshare(), but I think it
would be more clean to avoid the side effects on failure, so with
this patch unshare_userns() does put_cred() itself and initializes
*new_cred only if create_user_ns() succeeeds.Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
02 May, 2013
2 commits
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Pull VFS updates from Al Viro,
Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch
create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated
create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and
seq_file etc).7kloc removed.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits)
don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables
proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h
proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs
proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE
take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c
ppc: Clean up scanlog
ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat
hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name
drm: Constify drm_proc_list[]
zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug
reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show()
proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent
airo: Use remove_proc_subtree()
rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE
rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/
proc: Add proc_mkdir_data()
proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h}
proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c
... -
Split the proc namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.h.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Serge E. Hallyn
cc: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
15 Apr, 2013
3 commits
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Changing uid/gid/projid mappings doesn't change your id within the
namespace; it reconfigures the namespace. Unprivileged programs should
*not* be able to write these files. (We're also checking the privileges
on the wrong task.)Given the write-once nature of these files and the other security
checks, this is likely impossible to usefully exploit.Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski
-
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski
-
When we require privilege for setting /proc//uid_map or
/proc//gid_map no longer allow an unprivileged user to
open the file and pass it to a privileged program to write
to the file.Instead when privilege is required require both the opener and the
writer to have the necessary capabilities.I have tested this code and verified that setting /proc//uid_map
fails when an unprivileged user opens the file and a privielged user
attempts to set the mapping, that unprivileged users can still map
their own id, and that a privileged users can still setup an arbitrary
mapping.Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski
27 Mar, 2013
2 commits
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Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
14 Mar, 2013
1 commit
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Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
27 Jan, 2013
2 commits
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When I initially wrote the code for /proc//uid_map. I was lazy
and avoided duplicate mappings by the simple expedient of ensuring the
first number in a new extent was greater than any number in the
previous extent.Unfortunately that precludes a number of valid mappings, and someone
noticed and complained. So use a simple check to ensure that ranges
in the mapping extents don't overlap.Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
When freeing a deeply nested user namespace free_user_ns calls
put_user_ns on it's parent which may in turn call free_user_ns again.
When -fno-optimize-sibling-calls is passed to gcc one stack frame per
user namespace is left on the stack, potentially overflowing the
kernel stack. CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER forces -fno-optimize-sibling-calls
so we can't count on gcc to optimize this code.Remove struct kref and use a plain atomic_t. Making the code more
flexible and easier to comprehend. Make the loop in free_user_ns
explict to guarantee that the stack does not overflow with
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER enabled.I have tested this fix with a simple program that uses unshare to
create a deeply nested user namespace structure and then calls exit.
With 1000 nesteuser namespaces before this change running my test
program causes the kernel to die a horrible death. With 10,000,000
nested user namespaces after this change my test program runs to
completion and causes no harm.Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Pointed-out-by: Vasily Kulikov
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
15 Dec, 2012
1 commit
-
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
20 Nov, 2012
4 commits
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Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
-
To keep things sane in the context of file descriptor passing derive the
user namespace that uids are mapped into from the opener of the file
instead of from current.When writing to the maps file the lower user namespace must always
be the parent user namespace, or setting the mapping simply does
not make sense. Enforce that the opener of the file was in
the parent user namespace or the user namespace whose mapping
is being set.Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
- Add CLONE_THREAD to the unshare flags if CLONE_NEWUSER is selected
As changing user namespaces is only valid if all there is only
a single thread.
- Restore the code to add CLONE_VM if CLONE_THREAD is selected and
the code to addCLONE_SIGHAND if CLONE_VM is selected.
Making the constraints in the code clear.Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
This allows entering a user namespace, and the ability
to store a reference to a user namespace with a bind
mount.Addition of missing userns_ns_put in userns_install
from Gao fengAcked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"